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Abstract 
Using an original dataset, the study sets out to model report allocation in the European 
Parliament (EP). Putting aside the debate on the relative importance of national delegations, 
the review takes into account another specificity which has largely been ignored in previous 
empirical research: Only parts of the elected members are inclined to invest in European 
legislative work.  
Once the free-riders are filtered out, it appears the EP has developed much of the 
organizational aspects needed to assert its powers. The study adapts American theories of 
legislative organization to the European context, and finds transnational political groups to be 
central players in a largely consensual arrangement. Expertise is of increasing importance, 
and is put to use for the common good. Legislative drafts are objects of an informational two-
level game between the floor majority and caucuses. As Parliament matters more, report 
allocation becomes more competitive; thereby enhancing the traditional organizational 
features predicted by theory. 
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1 Introduction: Seeking power 
1.1 Legitimacy and power 
The European Coal and Steel Community started off as a peace keeping project between 
former enemies. But as the powers of the Community have been continuously extended 
since its beginning in the 1950-ies, former patterns of cooperation may not provide the 
sufficient democratic legitimacy to the organization.  
Despite the long legalistic and bureaucratic tradition of the European Community 
(EC), the ever increasing delegations of power to the supranational level have spurred a 
debate around its perceived “democratic deficit”. Democratizing the European Union (EU) 
has become a project of linking European institutions to its citizens without the mediation of 
national-states. Hence political scientists, politicians and political commentators alike tend 
to hold forth the need to revalorize the European Parliament (EP) as a means to bridge the 
gap between democracy and power. The democratic legitimacy of the EU is therefore closely 
linked to the capacity of Parliament to organize its work effectively.  
From this point of view, it was a major breakthrough in 1979 to become directly 
elected. Being representative to the EP became from this date a full-time occupation, 
allowing for a professionalized European political class. The institution has subsequently 
distinguished itself by the efforts spent to increase its powers to fit its elected legitimacy 
(Corbett, 1998).  
The formal powers of the EP have been considerably enhanced the last few decades. 
The Single European Act (1986) introduced the assent- and the cooperation procedures. The 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) introduced the co-decision procedure which has been extended 
and reinforced both in Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). Much of the scholarly debate on 
EP powers has been concentrated on a formal, legalistic analysis of the relative power 
Parliament has won during these treaty revisions (e.g. Crombez 1996, 2001; Moser 1996; 
Rittberger 2000; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002). But, as another 
Europeanist, Pierre Hausemer, points out: « The solution to the so-called democratic deficit 
does not lie solely in the institutional set-up of the European Union (…). Rather, it is the 
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legislative participation of individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that 
determines whose opinions are represented » (Hausemer 2006: 506).  
Whereas the abovementioned studies have considered the EP as a single block, this is 
of course not the case. EP currently consists of seven party groups representing national 
parties from 27 states. And even among these groupings, individual legislative participation 
is highly unequal. Some MEPs yield more power than others. 
Who are these key-legislators in the EP? And do their characteristics change with the 
improvement of Parliament’s position? 
1.2 Specialization as a Strategy to Power. 
As of July 2009 the European Parliament consisted of 736 members. Quite naturally most of 
the legislative work is not done in plenary, but prepared beforehand. This “passage of 
legislation through the Parliament illustrates the central role of committees in forming the 
EP’s positions” (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 341). 
Committees exist in order to make parliamentarian work more efficient. They offer 
arenas for specialization where MEPs may acquire the competences needed to challenge the 
executive and influence policy-making. “The key aspect is information: investment in 
committee work makes members of Parliament (MPs) better informed and reduces the 
informational advantage of the executive” (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 334). A Parliament 
with active and well-organized committees is potentially a powerful assembly.  
“Structural features of legislatures ‘matter greatly in the production of political 
outcomes’ and in the viability of the political system” (Polsby quoted in Krehbiel, 1991: 1). 
This is why the present study will examine how the European legislature is organized and 
why. American scholars of legislative organization have insisted upon the central role of 
committees in the preparation of legislation. This, they agree, is where policies are 
developed and where individual legislators may have an impact (e.g. Krehbiel, 1991, 1993; 
Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 1994; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994). Yet, because these theories 
use hypotheses which have mainly been drawn from and tested on the US Congress, their 
implications will have to be adapted to a European context.  
Most of Parliament’s deliberations are done on the basis of conclusions of one of its 
committees. These conclusions are given in a report drawn up by one or several MEPs, called 
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“rapporteurs”. Rapporteurs have the responsibility to collect the information needed to 
consider propositions from Commission or Council, they suggest amendments and negotiate 
an acceptable deal between European party groups. If the amendments cause a conflict 
between the EP and other institutions, it is also the custom that the rapporteur participates 
in these negotiations (Bowler and Farrell, 1995).  
Even though the rapporteur is the single most important legislator within the EP for any 
individual piece of legislation, Hausemer stresses that “little is known about the legislative 
participation of individual MEPs outside roll-call voting sessions” (2006: 506). A number of 
authors have sought to mend to the situation by different analyses of report allocation in the 
EP (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Benedetto, 2004; Kaeding, 2005; Hausemer, 2006; 
Høyland, 2006).  
Whereas previous studies have included only a selection of reports on shorter periods of 
time, the present study will make use of an original dataset which includes all data from the 
1979 elections to the end of the 6th legislature in 2009. Information concerning the 
legislative procedure under which reports have been allocated has been collected manually. 
The data allows an unprecedented examination of the organizational characteristics of 
report allocation, and how these traits change both over time and across procedures.  
1.3 Unequal Legislative Participation 
Rapporteurships are not distributed evenly between MEPs. Since the first direct elections, 
between 26% and 60% of all MEPs never drew any reports at all during their term. In the 
same period the average number of reports by parliamentarian ranged between 1,3 and 3,7; 
allowing in principle for a rather equal participation. Almost half of the reports were, 
nonetheless, captured by a small minority of parliamentarians. The discrepancy reaches a 
peak during the 6th period during which 48% of the legislative drafts were written by only 5% 
of the members of Parliament.   
As is shown from the distributions in figure 1, Parliament has developed an elite of 
MEPs who capture more than their share of legislative drafts. What are the determinants of 
such a discrepancy? Considering rapporteurs to be key legislators, the present study asks on 
what criteria are rapporteurships distributed in the European Parliament? 
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Relative Distribution of Reports among Parliamentarians 
Legislative 
Period 
EP1 
(1979-84) 
EP2 
(1984-89) 
EP3 
(1989-94) 
EP4 
(1994-99) 
EP5 
(1999-04) 
EP6 
(2004-09) 
N. of Seats 410 434 518 567 626 732 
N. of Reports Report MEP Report MEP Report MEP Report MEP Report MEP Report MEP 
0 - 36 % - 37 % - 29 % - 28 % - 26 % - 60 % 
1-2 19 % 31 % 19 % 32 % 10 % 25 % 17 % 31 % 14 % 28 % 28 % 27 % 
3-5 32 % 20 % 30 % 19 % 31 % 27 % 51 % 33 % 33 % 27 % 24 % 8 % 
6-max 49 % 13 % 52 % 13 % 59 % 19 % 33 % 9 % 53 % 19 % 48 % 5 % 
Abs. Count 1293 542 1520 632 2214 602 1958 729 2205 699 1254 943 
Average rep. 2,4 2,4 3,7 2,7 2,5 1,3 
 
 
American scholars are divided as to the nature of the legislative organization of the US 
Congress. Whereas the some authors deem the system to be organized in order to 
accommodate the individual interests of its members (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994), others 
reckon legislative work is structured by the collective interests of the assembly (Krehbiel, 
1991, 1993) and/or its political groups (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 1994). The present study 
will adapt and combine these views from observations done previously in the Europeanist 
literature.  
We will find that legislative organization in the EP follows an informational rationale 
in which committee work, as expressed by the drawing of reports, is structured in a 
consensual manner by the floor, and further organized by transnational party groups. The 
expertise which is acquired by individual MEPs is thereby used to further the collective 
interests of both the chamber and its caucuses. As a consequence, individuals compete for 
influence through the accumulation of draft legislation within a consensual structure. As 
Parliament gains more power, competition becomes harsher.  
Figure 1: Relative Distribution of Reports among Parliamentarians 
The figure expresses the frequency of reports written by any individual MEP, the relative 
amount of reports in the given category and the relative number of MEPs who have taken 
on as many reports during each legislative period. 
 As is seen from the figure, between 28% and 60% of the parliamentarians never 
wrote any reports during their term, whereas almost half of all reports were captured by a 
small minority of MEPs. 
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 All three theories assume MPs to be careerist politicians who seek reelection through 
legislative work. Because of the unique nature of the European Parliament, this does not 
necessarily hold true. Quite a number of parliamentarians do not engage in legislative tasks, 
and have no ambitions for further influence in the EP. The theoretical grounds of this study 
encompass mainly the organizational characteristics of careerist MEPs, yet to test their 
relevance free-riders have to be distinguished from the analysis.  
 From this method, we will find that the EP has developed a core of key-legislators 
which in many respects reflects the organizational characteristics of national legislatures. 
The EP has throughout the period developed the organizational capacities required to make 
use of its formal powers.  
 In the following the relevant theories on the subject will be reviewed and general 
hypotheses will be derived from their postulates (Chapter 2). The study will secondly go 
through the existing literature on the subject as well as the formal organization of the EP 
(Chapter 3) in order to adapt and operationalize the hypotheses (Chapter 5). The approach 
being quantitative, the discussion is followed up with a first evaluation through a bivariate 
analysis of the general trends in the distribution of reports (Chapter 4). Two models of 
report allocation will then be fitted by the depicted theories (Chapter 6). After a brief 
discussion of the adequacy of the models (chapter 7) the study will proceed to conclude 
whether the EP has developed some of the organizational characteristics of an ordinary 
assembly (chapter 8). 
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2 Theory and Hypotheses 
The review of the American literature (2.1) is needed to draw the outline of a unified theory 
of the European legislative organization. Rather than testing their general applicability their 
general postulates (2.2) will be adapted to the European reality in order to assess how the 
workings of the EP are best described. The enterprise is much helped by the extensive data 
on report allocation at hand. (2.3)  
2.1 Theories on Legislative Organization 
Theorizing legislative organization supposes a common origin both for political institutions 
and the politics they yield. In short, players have to accept the structure within which they 
are playing; hence the central question in the theoretical debates of how to accommodate 
individual preferences with collective interests.  
2.1.1 Distributive Theory 
The first generation of distributive theories tends to be individualistic, implying no notion of 
common good. MPs are rational, utility-maximizing players seeking to capture gains from 
trade. They engage in a zero-sum game in which the essential question is who gains what, 
and at whose expense (Krehbiel, 1991: 3, 24-26, 30; Shepsle and Weingast, 1994: 150-153).   
In the seminal work of David Mayhew (1974) legislators have one preference only: To 
be reelected. Legislative activity revolves around maximizing chances for reelection by giving 
the electorate what it expects (quoted in Shepsle and Weingast, 1994: 154). As most positive 
legislative theories have been developed from American studies of the single ballot majority 
system, the electoral connection is often operationalized to be geographical. Thus, legislative 
work is a question of providing benefits for one specific geographical constituency while 
dispersing the costs (Krehbiel, 1991: 25-26).  
Second generation authors like Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast keep the 
rational approach, but allow legislators’ preferences to be both heterogeneous and complex: 
“Their purposes derive in part from the electoral connection, in part from personal notions 
of good public policy, in part from institutional ambition, and in part from the influence of 
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others.” This makes for a constellation of unique, individual preferences in which each MP 
starts out in a potential conflict of one against all (1994: 154).  
Majoritarianism requires any decision – whether procedural or political – to be done 
by the majority of the assembly. As the number of policy dimensions is only limited by the 
number of possible majorities, there may never be equilibrium. Alternative winning 
coalitions will always exist which may profit from overturning the present consensus. The 
first generation of rational legislative theories modeled an inherently unstable system that is 
not warranted in empirical studies (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994: 154; Krehbiel, 1991: 16, 
28). 
This discord is partially due to the fact that early theories did not model important 
features in the legislative institutions and processes such as committee structures and 
parliamentary procedures. In order to prevent defection, formal theorists like Kenneth 
Shepsle (1986a; 1986b) and Weingast and Marshall (1988) incorporate institutions capable 
of constraining the number of outcomes. This, they argue, is because “heterogeneous tastes 
make the exchange of support both necessary and attractive: The value a legislator places on 
his or her own projects often will exceed the burdens he or she must bear in supporting the 
projects of other legislators” (Shepsle and Weingast, 1994: 154). This is the reason why a 
system of policy-field specific committees has developed where members of different 
committees in effect exchange influence and support. 
An institutional equilibrium is induced by the delegation of decisional power to a 
subset of legislators (i.e. committees) who detain “gatekeeping powers” and profit from 
“closed rules” preventing the main chamber from amending committee drafts (Krehbiel, 
1991: 32, 37). For this institutional arrangement to work, it is important that committee 
members are able to self-select to the committees which interest them the most. 
Committees have to retain an extraordinary influence over the policy area in question, and 
committee jurisdictions have to be updated at all time in order to prevent conflict. By this 
system MPs trade their support across issues in order to gain majority for their own causes.  
As a result of the self-selection, committees are composed of those whose demands 
in this specific policy area are higher than the median in the chamber (Krehbiel, 1991: 43). 
This leads Krehbiel to wonder why a legislature would choose to organize itself in such a way 
that the work done does not reflect the majority point of view? Structures might induce 
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equilibria, but without explaining institutions themselves, distributive theories tend towards 
functionalism (1991: 16, 28).   
David Baron and John Ferejohn (1989) go around the enforcement problem by 
introducing impatience among players. Keeping to a simple game of dividing the dollar, they 
assume the dollar to shrink every time the final decision is delayed by alternative winning 
coalitions. They thereby create an incentive among legislators to adhere to institutional 
arrangements which allow for closed rules and a swift settlement (Krehbiel, 1991: 40-41). 
This solution is much more palatable to Krehbiel who indeed expects procedural 
rights within distributive theories to favor standing committees – especially those whose 
policy space are highly particularistic – rather than the parent chamber. This, concludes 
Krehbiel, is one of the reasons why a legislature confers benefits to those who do not reflect 
the majority point of view (1991: 43-44).  
2.1.2 Informational Theory 
Distributive theories have gone a long way in understanding the workings of the US 
Congress, but it does – in Keith Krehbiels view – suffer from obvious shortcomings. These he 
exposes in Information and Legislative Organization (1993) along with his informational 
approach to legislative organization. Keeping the game of conflict, he also assumes players 
to be rational utility-maximizers. However, any legislative organization is subject to two 
restrictions. First, he expects consequences of the majoritarian principle to be more 
straightforward than what distributive theorists have construed. By this he introduces a 
notion of common good (as expressed by the majority) which is completely absent from 
previous generations of legislative theories. Second, whereas in the first generation of 
distributive theories what a legislator sees is what he gets, in the informational view no 
policy maker can be sure of the actual effects of decisions. There will always be a 
discrepancy between the intent of policies and their outcomes. Yet, legislators’ chances for 
reelection depend upon the outcome of their politics (Krehbiel, 1991: 15-20, 62-63, 66-67). 
Legislators always prefer policies whose consequences are known to those who are not. 
The best way to reduce the rift is to acquire information. Acquisition of expertise is costly, 
but it is potentially beneficial for the entire chamber. Yet, as information is not equally 
distributed, it may be used strategically to further individual preferences. Abandoning the 
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zero-sum game for a positive one, Krehbiel consequently expects institutions to create 
incentives for committee members both to specialize and to share information with peers 
(Krehbiel, 1991: 62-69, 73-74). 
MPs reflect their electorate both by having different preferences and different skills. An 
effective legislative organization makes use of both aspects (Krehbiel, 1991: 77-78):  In order 
to create incentives for specialization among the most skilled MPs, Krehbiel models 
restrictive rules which occasionally give committee members a distributional advantage 
compared to the floor. Yet, according to the majoritarian principle the chamber decides 
upon the rights delegated to committees. Therefore, restrictive rules alternate with open 
rules in order to prevent preference outliers to gain a legislative monopoly.  
In the words of Krehbiel “the subservient nature of committees in informational theories 
cannot be overemphasized.” (1991: 80) It is the legislature which chooses the most skilled 
among its members, and no self-selection to committees takes place. The greatest incentive 
of informational honesty is when specialists’ and non-specialists’ preferences coincide (1991: 
81-82). Committee members’ preferences are therefore heterogeneous, reflecting the 
political composition of the chamber in such a way that every floor member may find a 
reliable informant within the committee (1991: 96). Consequently the efficiency of 
informational circulation requires committees to avoid preference outliers – unless these 
high demanders have been able to specialize at a lower cost than moderate MPs (1991: 95-
96). 
At the institutional level, Krehbiel formulates two expectations: Restrictive rules will be 
positively associated with committee specialization, non-outlying and heterogeneous 
committees. Similarly, gains from trade are side-effects, and not institutionalized, as such an 
arrangement would yield distributional loss and informational inefficiency (1991: 97-98). 
Both Shepsle and Weingast welcome the efforts done to model the informational game 
of committee specialization and deem it to be an important contribution to legislative 
theory. Yet, they point out that (mainly for reasons of simplicity) Krehbiel assumes the policy 
space to be unidimensional and committee preferences to reflect the median voter in the 
mother chamber. But preferences in only one dimension do not allow for exchanges across 
issues, nor do you find median voters across multidimensional spaces. “In a one-good world, 
an individual can only trade apples for apples, one for one.” Trading of committee seats 
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would be futile if everyone had the same vested interests in all policy domains. “Only in a 
multi-good world, can individuals with different preferences exchange apples in return for 
oranges.” (1994: 168) Krehbiel thereby removes the distributional explanation of 
committees with separate jurisdictions reflecting separate interests, and stumbles once 
again into majority cycling on an institutional level. But if the defendant of the informational 
theory could accept the conditions for the trade-offs to be institutionalized (i.e. 
multidimensional), the perspective might be merged with the distributive one. “In a world of 
multiple political issues, the two approaches are mutually reinforcing.” (1994: 168-169) 
Both approaches formulate a game in which the only structure-induced equilibrium 
emanates from the committees (1994: 168-169). The partisan approach, presented in 
Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House by Cox and McCubbins (1993), 
introduces another equilibrium-enforcing institution: Political parties. 
2.1.3 Partisan Theory  
In the partisan rationale, the strain is resolved by the introduction of political parties. Both 
nomination for reelection and assignment to committees (and other parliamentarian offices) 
are controlled by the party. Unruly party members risk exclusion from the group – and 
thereby loosing the benefits conferred to them by the caucus. Discipline is ensured as long 
as the costs of defection exceed its’ benefits (Cox and McCubbins, 1994: 217-218). 
 
“One example is the investment of time on a committee, which endows the member 
with human capital – contacts, knowledge, lists of contributors – whose value would 
decline were the member transferred to another committee. It also endows a 
member with seniority on the committee. (…) Neither committee specific human 
capital nor committee-specific seniority is readily transferable to other uses should 
the member be expelled from the party and from party-contingent committee 
assignments.” (Cox and McCubbins, 1994: 218) 
 
This applies especially to majority party members whose options either would be to apply 
for membership in a less influential party with less extensive resources (staff etc.), or 
continue the work as non-affiliated members. The consequences of exclusion are even direr 
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when the candidate has to run for reelection without the support of a party (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1994: 219-220). 
On his part Krehbiel considers committee selection by party groups to be contrary to 
the majoritarian principle. As all suggestions are ratified in the end by the floor as a whole, 
any political coalition may be overturned by another majority, irrespective of party affiliation 
(1991: 17). Political parties may well be a nice indicator of policy interests, but when 
preferences diverge, party groups have no constraining power. Caucuses have just as much 
to lose from renouncing its experts, as do the experts themselves. How then can the threat 
of exclusion be credible? 
More than simply sharing common preferences, MPs share – in the partisan 
perspective – a political reputation with their fellow party members. If one member’s 
actions tarnish their collective reputation, and assuming that “caucus members are purely 
office-seekers, the loyalists will in fact have a credible threat; it will be in their own 
immediate electoral interests to vote against reinstatement (or to vote for exclusion).” (Cox 
and McCubbins, 1994: 225)  
Yet, it is not as much the sticks as it is the carrots which explain the continuous 
existence of political parties. “It may be that the caucus rules are efficacious not so much 
because they are credibly enforced but rather because they serve an informational role.” 
(Cox and McCubbins, 1994: 225) This applies both for the confidence between committees 
and the floor, and party group members and the caucus. The authors point out that “in 
Congress, committees frequently have their handiwork amended, or even undone, on the 
floor.” (1994: 225) But as long as this is an exceptional behavior, the incentive to specialize 
remains guiding, and the system is perpetrated purely by shared interests (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1994: 225-226). 
Krehbiel expects rational legislators to choose according to the ultimate 
consequences of their actions. This is why he concentrates his discussion on the credibility of 
an exclusion from the group. Cox and McCubbins insist on their part on the intermediate 
stages. They do not only envisage exclusion, but also a variety of other less drastic (and 
therefore more convincing) consequences. The most obvious among these would of course 
be the invalidation by the caucus – through the floor vote – of committee propositions from 
disloyal comrades. This makes for a span of disciplinary tools for the party whips. 
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Even though Krehbiel has opposed the notion of constraining party politics (1991: 
101-102; 1993), the informational and partisan view are to a certain extent compatible: In 
the informational approach floor members are expected to take advice from committee 
members with similar preferences.  
 
“In response to the need of members for more guidance than the committee system 
provides, an informal system of expertise appears to have been developed alongside, 
and overlapping, it. Trusted member who are believed to have superior knowledge of 
certain subjects achieve recognition as specialists. They guarantee to their fellows the 
feasibility of certain proposals, challenge others. They process and digest raw facts and 
communicate them in the form of “do” or “don’t” recommendations. (…) In 
recompense for their efforts they are given the confidence of their fellows – their bills 
go through, they shape policy – they have power.” (Buchanan et al., 1970, 650 quoted 
in Krehbiel, 1991: 75) 
 
Party members have common policy objectives (i.e. preferences), and therefore take cues 
from each other. Just as Krehbiel points out, information may be used strategically to induce 
fellow MPs to vote in a particular direction. The best guarantee against manipulation is when 
both share the same interests. As a preemptive disciplinary measure, authors therefore 
expect committees to be staffed by loyal representatives of party groups, “irrespective of 
whether they are interest- or information driven” (Yordanova, 2009: 264). The partisan view 
is therefore supplementary rather than in competition with the informational and 
distributional theories (Yordanova, 2009: 264-265). 
 The three approaches have different and partially competing empirical implications 
which allow for an assessment of their relevance for the European Parliament.   
2.2 Hypotheses 
Whereas all three theories originally have been formulated and tested essentially on 
committee assignments, the study assumes hypotheses to be readily transferable to the 
group of European rapporteurs.  
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2.2.1 Hypotheses Derived From the Distributive Approach. 
Distributive theories rely on the idea of individual MEPs seeking power in order to ensure 
reelection. All positions of power are expected to be instrumentalized in order to further 
individual preferences on the expense of the majority. This results in a high degree of self-
selection to important tasks such as rapporteurships.  
Institutionalized trade-offs give way to unrepresentative committees composed of 
preference outliers (Krehbiel, 1991: 43). Distributive theory thereby expects the preferences 
of the group of rapporteurs to differ significantly from the preferences of non-rapporteurs. 
 
Ha1: Because of the logic of self-selection, the measured preferences of the group of 
rapporteurs deviate significantly from the measured preferences of non-rapporteurs. 
 
This hypothesis stands in contradiction to Krehbiel’s expectations derived from the majority 
principle which states that because rapporteurs are selected by the floor “legislative 
committees will not, as a matter of practice, be composed predominantly of high demanders 
or preference outliers” (Krehbiel, 1991: 96).  
2.2.2 Hypotheses Derived From the Informational Approach. 
In the informational view policy-makers are chosen by their peers on two criteria: Their 
preferences and their competences.  
The strict definition of the majority principle in the informational approach requires 
committees to be microcosms of the mother chamber (Krehbiel, 1991: 96). Transposing this 
expectation to the case of European rapporteurs, one should find legislators whose 
preferences represent both sides of the policy spectrum as defined by the composition of 
the floor. 
 
Hb1: Because key legislators are chosen by the chamber majority, the measured 
preferences of the group of rapporteurs reflect the measured preferences of the floor.  
 
Hypothesisb1 stands by way of consequence in opposition to hypothesisa1 as presented in the 
previous section, and is alternative to the latter.   
14 
 
As being a member of the European Parliament has become a career path for a core 
of MEPs (Scarrow, 1997; Corbett, 1998), legislators should acquire some of their experience 
within the EP itself. What is more, in order to be recognized as expert, it is important to be 
renown by the rest of the assembly; hence the importance of incumbency as a criterion of 
selection among MEPs. Staying in office is a means of acquiring expertise and reputation, 
and should thus garner more reports. In the informational view the length of tenure is 
positively correlated to the acquisition of reports.  
 
Hb2: The group of rapporteurs has on average stayed longer in Parliament than non-
rapporteurs.  
 
The confirmation of specialization corroborates the informational approach on this specific 
matter. It is, nonetheless, compatible with both the distributive and partisan approach, and 
may be combined into one, single model. 
2.2.3 Hypotheses Derived From the Partisan Approach. 
According to the partisan view party groups have a key role in the organization of legislative 
work. The caucus chooses policy-makers who are susceptible to formulate and further the 
party view during legislation. The designated rapporteur should be known to the group. 
If the partisan perspective holds, the group of rapporteurs should therefore not consist 
in policy-outliers compared to their group of origin, but have preferences much in line with 
what is generally expressed in the caucus: 
 
Hc1: Because key legislators are selected by the caucus, the measured preferences of the 
group of rapporteurs reflect the measured preferences of the party group.  
 
The confirmation of hypothesisc1 does not necessarily reject the informational approach, as 
rapporteurs representative to their parties also represent both sides of the policy spectrum 
as is otherwise expected by Krehbiel (1991: 96). The following study will explore how well 
the informational and partisan perspectives work together, as informational criteria should 
be determinant both in negotiations between groups and selection within groups. 
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If caucuses are significant players during the distribution of reports, affiliation to a 
political group should be an advantage, whereas non-affiliated members have a drawback 
when reports are distributed. The null hypothesis follows Krehbiel’s argument that political 
groups are simple expressions of preferences: Every MEP has an equal chance for obtaining 
a report independent of group membership. 
 
Hc2: Independent members are under-represented among rapporteurs. 
 
If the hypothesis is rejected – that is, if the caucus is not able to ensure its members more 
reports than non-affiliated members – political groups in the EP are superfluous 
organizations and the partisan perspective has to be discarded.  
The general formulations of these hypotheses will later have to be operationalized in 
order to fit the European setting. What is new in the present study is the extent of the data – 
it encompasses all reports drawn in a period of 30 years. 
2.3 Data from the Last 30 Years 
Previous studies of the European Parliament have included either a small period of time (e.g. 
the 4th and 5th parliament in Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; or the first half on the 5th 
parliament in Hausemer, 2006), only parts of the legislature (e.g. the Environmental 
committee in the 4th parliament in Keading, 2005) or only certain reports (e.g. reports 
assigned under the co-decision procedure in Høyland, 2006).  
The present dataset include all six legislative periods from the first members of the 
European Parliament were directly elected in 1979 until the 2009 elections. It contains all 
reports written with an assigned rapporteur, the subject matter, the procedure under which 
it has been written, the date of the assignment, the name of the rapporteur(s) and the 
committee in question. I have furthermore collected manually all procedural data prior to 
1999 from the minutes present in the Official Journal of the European Communities, whereas 
data for the two remaining legislatures have been collected automatically (Høyland et al., 
2009).  
Bjørn Høyland’s automated database also contains information on all MEPs within this 
same period, their nationality, their date of birth, the committees, national parties and 
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European party groups on which they have been, as well as their position and the entry and 
exit dates. (www.folk.uio.no) 
Several variables have been derived from the NOMINATE scores calculated by Simon Hix, 
Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland from roll-call votes in Parliament from the 1st to the 5th 
parliament included. (data available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/HIX/) Computation of 
NOMINATE scores from the last period are a courtesy of Bjørn Høyland.  
The NOMINATE scaling method of individual voting decisions is developed by Poole and 
Rosenthal and have successfully been applied to the US Congress (1997, 233-51 quoted in 
Hix et al., 2006).  Roll-call votes are one of three possible voting methods in the EP, but it is 
the only one which registers individual votes. As even a small number of MEPs may request a 
roll-call vote, and as MEPs may behave differently when voting in public, this selection may 
be somewhat biased.  “Nevertheless, there is no evidence to suggest that roll-call votes are 
called disproportionately on particular policy issues, or by particular political groups or under 
particular legislative procedures” (McElroy, 2006: 19). These are the best data available, and 
have contributed to new insight into the European policy space.  
Two different data sets have been used: One consists in a list of all reports presented to 
the plenary. This list is used for the preliminary examination of report allocation, and to 
develop variables in the second data set. The main data set is ordered straightforwardly 
from the list of members in each legislature. One observation equals one MEP. As quite a 
number of MEPs do not stay in office the whole term, the number of observations in these 
studies is larger than the number of seats in Parliament. When the relative sizes of national 
delegations or party groups are discussed, however, this is done according to the number of 
seats, not the total number of parliamentarians.  
There has to this date not been published any study of report allocation using this 
span of data over such a large period. This makes it possible to reveal general trends which 
previously have only been tested on partial data.  
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3 Studying the European Parliament 
Theories of legislative organization have been developed – and tested – mainly on American 
legislatures. But how do they fit the European reality?  
A number of political scientists have already gone to efforts to analyze the legislative 
organization of the European Parliament (3.1). There is no simple way of recycling the 
empirical operationalizations used in American studies. Rather, to pinpoint the 
characteristics of key-legislators, a translation has to be done in view of the organizational 
rules and procedures of the European Parliament (3.2).  
3.1 State of the Art 
The implicit assumption that MEPs are office-seekers has rarely been questioned in empirical 
research on legislative work in the EP. On the other hand, most studies deem Parliament’s 
legislative organization to be information-driven, though the exact operationalization of 
preferences and specialization has proven difficult. 
3.1.1 A European Career? 
In order for any of the theories to apply, members of the European Parliament have to 
actually seek reelection.  
The 1979 elections created for the first time the basis for a group of full-time 
parliamentarians on a European level. Richard Corbett points nevertheless out three 
possible obstacles to the development of an autonomous European class of politicians: Are 
European politics considered as a career in its own right, or is a mandate in the EP simply a 
stepping-stone for younger legislators to obtain national offices? The EP has also been said 
to house a number of “ageing party horses put out to grass” by their national party groups 
(Burgess quoted in Corbett, 1998: 67). How concerned would retired politicians be in the 
well-being of their exile? In any case, a constantly high turnover rate would endanger the 
institutional memory (Corbett, 1998: 66-67).  
MEPs aiming at a European career have vested interests in increasing the position of 
the institution. This is, according to Susan Scarrow, increasingly the case, as the institution 
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has developed a core of MEPs with a long-term commitment to the European Parliament 
(Scarrow, 1997). Her conclusions are corroborated by the experience of Richard Corbett who 
emphasizes the informational advantage of an experienced core of legislators: 
 
”Despite the hard turnover there has, of course, remained a hard core of members 
remaining in the Parliament for years who, together with the secretariat and the 
officials, constitute the ‘memory’ of the Parliament and ensure that lack of experience 
of new MEPs does not imply that Parliament’s work is constantly starting from 
scratch.”  (Corbett, 1998: 68) 
 
Logically, a legislature which has reached maturity would make use of the experience 
acquired by long-termers, forming its own political class. In the frame of the present study, it 
seems likely that we a number of incumbent European parliamentarians should be found 
among Parliament’s key-legislators. 
Scarrow points out that “the maximum length of elected service is still dictated by 
the 1979 initiation of direct elections” (1997: 256). Hence she chooses to study the three 
electoral periods spanning from 1979 to the 1994 election. She finds that 64% of the MEPs 
were short-termers (they stayed for less than 1,5 electoral term) against 36%  who remained 
in office for more than 7 years (Scarrow, 1997: 256-57).  
Her work encompasses only four member states, insisting upon national differences 
in incumbency. The present study extends the data to all countries during all six periods 
following the 1979 election. How global are the tendencies? 
From what is seen in figure 3, the trend detected by Scarrow seems to be rather 
constant. Measuring for each legislative period the number of MEPs who were also present 
in the previous legislature, between 56% and 65% of all MEPs are freshmen. This number 
may be somewhat inflated by the arrival of parliamentarians from new member states 
during the 2nd, 4th and 6th legislature. Nonetheless, this still allows for an experienced core of 
legislators perpetrating institutional memory – especially because parliamentarian work is 
organized by party groups within which information should circulate quite freely (Høyland, 
2006: 45). 1% of the MEPs whose mandate expired in 2009 had actually served 30 
consecutive years on the EP.  
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Reelection to the European Paliament since 1979 
 Legislative Period EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
Consecutive terms  Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
0 377 60 % 312 52 % 457 63 % 390 56 % 609 65 % 
1 255 40 % 170 28 % 127 17 % 198 28 % 183 19 % 
2 - - 120 20 % 96 13 % 60 9 % 103 11 % 
3 - - - - 49 7 % 31 4 % 25 3 % 
4 - - - - - - 20 3 % 15 2 % 
5 - - - - - - - - 8 1 % 
Freshmen 377 60 % 312 52 % 457 63 % 390 56 % 609 65 % 
Incumbent  255 40 % 290 48 % 272 37 % 309 44 % 334 35 % 
Sum 632 100 % 602 100 % 729 100 % 699 100 % 943 100 % 
 
 
The assumption that MEPs will invest time in committee work because of careerist 
ambitions is bald, yet not wholly unreasonable. Bearing in mind Corbett’s concern, it is likely 
that European politicians pursue quite different career paths. Part of any predictive model of 
European legislative organization will therefore have to distinguish the workers from the 
free-riders, as only the first have incentives to invest in committee duties.  
As it is, there seems to be an initial stage of self-selection in the EP. Yet, the possibility to 
opt out can hardly by itself justify a distributive logic, as the latter also entails preference 
outliers. Most studies of legislative organization in the EP insist on the contrary on the 
informational game which takes place during legislation.  
3.1.2 An Informational Game with European Policy Experts 
Deeming the legislative process to be a game of asymmetric information, Giacomo 
Benedetto, points out that given that Council meetings are secret, the European Parliament 
Figure 3: Reelection to the European Parliament Since 1979 
The table expresses the absolute and relative distribution of consecutive terms served by 
MEPs. Because the present table includes all MEPs who have passed through Parliament, 
including representatives from new member states, the figures of freshmen should be 
expected to be slightly inflated during the 2nd, 4th and 6th legislature. As it stands, the 
proportion between newcomers and incumbent MEPs remains rather stable throughout 
the period. 
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bargains information-blind. Personal links to officials in other institutions may compensate 
for this disadvantage and give precious cues as to which strategies should be adopted by the 
EP (Benedetto, 2005: 70-71).  
The observations done by Bjørn Høyland (2006) go a long way in confirming these 
allegations, finding members of national parties which are also represented in the Council to 
be overrepresented among rapporteurs within the co-decision procedure (which implies an 
extended contact with the Council). Policy experts who are able to specialize at a lower cost 
should, indeed, gain more reports than those who are not. 
Similarly Corbett explains from his experience as an MEP that certain 
parliamentarians become part of policy networks at the meso-level of the three institutions 
(Commission, Parliament and Council). As these networks are on a subject basis, such 
experts “know who to see, when and about what.” He further states that “the participation 
of MEPs in such networks is as important a means of influence as their formal powers.” 
(Corbett, 1998: 86)  
Shaun Bowler and David M. Farrell study questions asked in plenary as well as 
committee assignments, and conclude that the EP has indeed developed the specializations 
required for a legislature to challenge the executive power (1995: 235). To all authors this 
expertise enhances EP influence, thereby confirming Krehbiel’s assumption of a positive-sum 
game (Corbett, 1998; Bowler and Farrel, 1995; Benedetto, 2005; McElroy, 2006; Høyland, 
2006). 
In the European Parliament the role of policy expert is held by the rapporteurs who 
write recommendations (i.e. “reports”) to the chamber on behalf of the committee. 
Rapporteurs build the sufficient political consensus for the bill to pass at the floor level, and 
they represent Parliament during inter-institutional negotiations. The more agile negotiators 
rapporteurs prove to be, the more the EP increases its influence (Benedetto, 2005: 85). In 
the European context it is therefore natural to extend the conventional study on committee 
assignment to the procedure of report allocation (Keading, 2004; Benedetto, 2005; 
Hausemer, 2006, Høyland, 2006; Yordanova, 2009). Once the criteria of selection have been 
established, it is interesting to see to what extent the literature on committee assignments 
match the provision of reports. How consistent are the organizational trends in the EP? 
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3.1.3 Difficult Measures of Preferences 
The driving force behind legislative work is MEPs’ preferences. The distributive and the 
informational perspectives have quite different predictions, however, on the subject matter. 
As special preferences tend to imply a certain amount of specialization, it has proven quite 
difficult to distinguish the two in empirical studies (Yordanova, 2009: 261; quite in 
opposition to the claims of Krehbiel, 1991: 7). 
It is common practice to assume nationality and party group affiliation to be 
indications of MEP preferences. In line with the informational view, national and political 
representation among both committee members and rapporteurs is roughly proportional to 
the composition of the floor (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; 
Benedetto, 2005; McElroy, 2006).  
Measuring preferences within specific policy domains, on the other hand, has not 
given any conclusive empirical results. Bowler and Farrell (1995) try without much luck to 
distinguish which of the distributional or informational views determine European 
organization of committees. (1995: 241). Their chosen indicators of policy preferences – 
relations to interest groups and previous occupational attachments – do not distinguish well 
preference outliers from specialized MEPs. By and large one may wonder whether such links 
indicate competitive specialization (informational hypothesis) or extreme preferences 
(distributive hypothesis). Moreover, Krehbiel’s expectation of the selection of low-cost high-
demanders hardly lends itself to univocal operationalizations. Politicians with a previous 
national career have indeed political experience, but won’t they also have special interests in 
the stance of their national party? Links to pressure groups provide MEPs with more 
information, but doesn’t it reflect a special interest? The authors find certain committees to 
reflect heterogeneous preferences, whereas other committees reflect the homogenous 
composition of high demanders.  
Michael Kaeding (2004), on his part, opts for a qualitative evaluation of political 
preferences on one specific policy domain in his study of the Environmental committee 
during the 4th period (1995-99). He finds the group of rapporteurs to be biased, but proposes 
subsequent studies to combine the two concepts of demanding and informative 
committees. 
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Nicoleta Yordanova (2009) takes this into account and distinguishes in advance which 
committees she expects to be informative (i.e. heterogeneous and representative) and 
which committees she expects to be distributional (i.e. homogeneous and extreme). Quite 
obviously this is a step away from the predictive ambitions of Krehbiel, but the 
categorization opens for a merger of the distributive and informative view.  
Responding to Kaeding’s suggestion that within the consensual frame of European 
organization players adopt different political strategies for legislative participation, Pierre 
Hausemer expects “MEPs to spend their time on policy areas that matter to their 
constituents.” (2006: 520, 516) His dependent variable is therefore a measure of report 
salience deduced from Budge et al.’s analysis of national party manifestos (2001). His 
conclusion is that whereas parliamentarians compete for the reports which are the most 
salient to their electorate, rapporteurs are chosen by the party group and are thus not 
preference outliers. (2006: 524)   
At last, Gail McElroy (2006) chooses roll-call votes in plenary sessions as a means of 
measuring policy preference. In contrast to Bowler and Farrell she simply labels occupational 
background and ties to interest groups as “specializations”. In order to distinguish the 
distributive approach from the informational, she adds a variable of ideology based on first 
dimension NOMINATE scores as developed by Simon Hix et al. (2005). She finds committees 
to be highly specialized, yet committee members’ scores do not deviate significantly from 
the ideological composition of the floor, thus corroborating the informational approach.  
NOMINATE scores is a relative measure as they express to what degree individual 
MEPs vote in line with other representatives during the same legislature. In the same logic, 
Richard Whitaker (2005) chooses MAD scores developed by Cox and McCubbins (1993) and 
concludes from roll-call votes that committee members also vote in line with their national 
party delegations. Furthermore, national delegations maintain higher levels of 
representativeness on committees endowed with legislative powers (i.e. committees where 
EP powers are the most extended). The underlying argument is that as the European 
Parliament matters more, competition for committee seats will be crisper, and thus, the 
representativeness of committees will increase.  
As we have seen, the earlier contributions to this literature aim to distinguish the 
distributive and informational approaches by validating competitive hypotheses (Bowler and 
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Farrell, 1995; McElroy, 2006). Quite an important part of the literature emphasizes the 
informational advantage of specialized MEPs. (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Whitaker, 
2005; Benedetto, 2005; Høyland, 2006) Yet, recent studies tend to combine concepts from 
both theories, taking the informational bargain for granted, as well as including aspects of 
the partisan approach (Kaeding, 2004; Yordanova, 2009).  
From the review of relevant literature, the distributive approach seems to have been 
abandoned in favor of the informational approach, occasionally complemented by a partisan 
view of European parliamentary groups. None of the above mentioned studies take into 
account the differing ambitions among MEPs and their consequences on report distribution. 
The present study will consequently venture to explain the assignment of 
rapporteurs by a combination of these theories; expecting the informational approach to 
hold true, and testing for signs of partisan considerations. The predictive value of theories 
depends however, on the personal ambitions of MEPs, and will have to be accounted for.  
3.2 Legislative Organization of the EP – Rules and 
Procedures 
According to Krehbiel, “to understand legislative organization is to understand legislative 
institutions, that is, rules and precedents that act as binding constraints on legislators’ 
behavior.” (1991: 14) In the European literature, Virginie Mamadouh and Tapio Raunio 
assess separately the formal powers of committees (3.2.1) before discussing the relationship 
between committees and party groups (3.2.2.) (2003: 334-335). 
The intent of this evaluation is to distinguish possible operationalizations of the 
previously defined hypotheses, as well as to formulate expectations about the empirical 
characteristics of rapporteurs.  
3.2.1 Committee Power vis-à-vis the Parent Chamber  
The US Congress is, in the authors’ opinion, a “prime example” of a committee-based 
legislature. The bulk of parliamentarian work is done in committees, just as it is done in the 
European Parliament.  (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 334-335; Corbett, 2007: 126) 
24 
 
Even though they compare the workings of the European Parliament to that of the US 
Congress, Mamadouh and Raunio curiously engage in a comparison between the formal 
powers of committees in the EP and the 15 national parliaments in EU Member States (as of 
1999) (2003: 334-337). Their choice is probably justified by the system of proportional 
ballots and the multiple parties of the EP which should make it more like any European 
system than the rather singular American two-party system. 
The authors select 6 indicators of committee power in relation to the plenary based 
on data from Herbert Döring’s comparative work (Döring, 1995):  
In their exercise of control of the executive EP committees may request documents 
from the Commission. The Commission has no formal obligation to comply with the inquiry, 
but the parliamentarian right for the assembly to sack the Commission should certainly 
make the latter more obliging. This is somewhat weaker than the average parliamentarian 
system:  Seven out of 15 national committees have the formal right to request documents 
from their government. Furthermore, most national committees may not compel witnesses. 
This is also the case for the European Parliament which may invite, but not force witnesses 
to appear before its committees (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 337). 
Turning to legislative work, the influence of European committees is weakly 
improved. Committee meetings in the European Parliament take place before the plenary. 
This is certainly an advantage. As plenary deliberations are mainly based on committee 
reports, European committee work has presumably a greater importance than in those four 
member states where bills are already voted upon when reaching the committee stage. On 
the other hand, the agenda of EP committees is set by the parent chamber, and not by the 
committee itself. In addition, the time-table is mostly occupied by Commission proposals 
which are referred to the appropriate committee by the Directorate General for the 
Presidency (Corbett, 2007: 135). This lack of control is the case for most national committees 
as well (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 335-37).  
As for the contents of parliamentarian work, committees in the European Parliament 
have as much freedom as elsewhere in Europe. Only in three out of 15 member states is it 
possible for committees to initiate legislation. In the case of EP committees, “own initiative 
reports have always been subject to prior approval” (Corbett, 2007: 137). Yet, committees 
may propose amendments to Commission proposals that are so substantial that they in fact 
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constitute a new text (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 337). This is all the more important 
that the right of legislative initiative in the EU-system is with the Commission, and not the 
Parliament.  
The study of the formal rights of EP committees leads Mamadouh and Raunio to 
conclude that European committees are “no stronger” – especially when it comes to 
informational rights – than those of the parliamentarian Member States of the EU (2003: 
341). EP committees hardly yielding more formal power than their European homologues, it 
is a fortiori difficult to claim the EP to be a committee-based legislative in the American 
sense. Yet, declare Bowler and Farrell, “the fact that the EP does have a developed 
committee system is, by some European experiences, an innovation”, whatever their power 
seem to be (1995: 227). 
The lay-out of the European legislative organization certainly expresses an intention 
of using committees as a forum for informational bargains, yet at the same time let the floor 
majority keep in control.  
Committee propositions are generally voted over in plenary under open rules 
(Corbett, 2007: 176-77). This, as well as the committee dependency upon the floor in its own 
agenda-setting, indicates a firm grip by the chamber. The system of open rules is contrary to 
the distributional requirement of closed rules as an incentive for committee members to 
participate in legislative chores. The relative liberal rules of committee amendments, and the 
very fact that meetings are prior to the plenary in order to prepare winning coalitions, 
should, however, give incentives to invest in committee work. There are, furthermore, no 
indications of majority cycling in the EP which should point to the presence of another 
equilibrium-inducing institution. 
Mamadouh and Raunio turn to scrutinize the second criterion of a committee-based 
legislature: weak party groups.  
3.2.2 Group Power vis-à-vis Committee Members 
The authors affirm that “apart from formal rules, the strength of committees depends on 
parties.” The underlying argument is that heterogeneous political groups are unable to 
command members’ loyalties. The lack of party discipline therefore makes it more difficult 
for political groups to dominate the workings of the assembly. Decisions are no longer taken 
26 
 
within the groups, but by the official organs of the parliament. Thus, “when parties are 
heterogeneous, the legislature probably becomes more committee oriented.” (Mamadouh 
and Raunio, 2003: 334) 
 It is precisely the deficient party discipline which has prevented the American system 
of strict separation of powers from an institutional impasse. Even when the majority in 
Congress and the President come from the same party, the executive is never guaranteed 
majority approval, as caucus members may well defect from the party line. Negotiations 
take thereby place in committees, and not within the caucus.  
Parliamentary committees in the EP give a central role to individual members, not 
the least by its system of rapporteurs, who are in charge of negotiating a majority for his 
draft (Corbett, 2007: 126). How is the role of EP parliamentary groups in this system? 
Mamadouh and Raunio identify three means for party groups to affirm themselves – 
and by consequence reducing committee autonomy: This can be done in the appointment 
process where either the preferences of the MEPs themselves may prevail, or the 
preferences of the group leadership. Second, the degree to which group leaderships may 
constrain members’ committee work. And, third, what means of sanction the leadership 
disposes of (Damgaard, 1995 quoted in Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 338).  
Selecting individuals 
As for the appointment process to committees, this is done by the political groups and in 
such a way as to reflect the overall political balance between caucuses (rule 152 quoted in 
Mamadoh and Raunio, 2003: 338; Corbett, 2007: 128). The same goes for committee chair 
and vice-chairs, which are allocated following the proportional d’Hont system (Corbett, 
2007: 130). The system reflects the informational view, and is empirically confirmed for the 
first half of the 3rd legislative period (1989-92): ”The composition of committees generally 
reflects the national and ideological composition of the chamber” (Bowler and Farrel, 1995: 
227-28).  
The appointment of rapporteurs follows the same pattern: The distribution is not 
regulated in the Rules of Procedure, but an officious system of allocation has been 
developed: At the beginning of each period the political groups receive a quota of points 
according to their size. Whenever a report is to be drawn, group coordinators set a prize and 
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then start bidding for the dossier on behalf of their group. The victorious caucus then names 
the rapporteur of their choice (Corbett, 2007: 140). Even though no MEP is forced to write a 
report (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 343), there is no doubt that political parties are 
determinant in the selection of individual legislators; first in the selection of committee 
members, then in the selection of rapporteurs among committee members.  
A fair representation of ideological differences is important. Yet, from his experience 
as an MEP Richard Corbett explains that during the “auction” for reports it may lower the 
“prize” if a group coordinator is able to name a rapporteur who is recognized as a specialist 
on the issue. This is especially true when the report is of a technical nature, rather than 
political. Reports on certain subjects are therefore “referred to the same specialist again and 
again, often for very few points” (Corbett, 2007: 140 (quoted); Benedetto, 2005: 71). This 
confirms Krehbiel’s expectations stating that a small amount of reports may be allocated to 
recognized policy experts. 
Within the group, national parties are in a predominant role – both in the selection of 
committee members and of rapporteurs – and they should be expected to defend their 
position in the allocation procedures. This is why, explain Mamadouh and Raunio, once the 
political groups have done their first distribution of positions, a second round of proportional 
allocation is initiated according to the size of national delegations within a group (Kreppel, 
2002: 190). Their analysis of the formal appointment, however, leads Mamadouh and Raunio 
to conclude that “partisan interests drive the allocation process” (2003: 344). 
Controlling individuals 
Once the appointment has been done, what are the means for group leadership to constrain 
committee members? Party discipline implies means for the caucus to persuade MEPs to act 
in a way they otherwise would not have done. As Cox and McCubbins already have called to 
attention, discipline may include both sticks and carrots.  
The carrots are essentially to be found in the appointment process which is 
controlled mainly by political groups. MEPs out of favor run the risk of not being appointed 
to new positions. Mamadouh and Raunio quote the MEP Survey from 2000 in which a large 
majority (65%) of the respondents considered most attractive positions controlled by 
caucuses, namely the chair of committee and EP President. Only 18% considered the leader 
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of the national party contingent to be the most attractive position. Last, 16% deemed the 
chair of the political group to be most attractive (2003: 339-40).  
In their evaluation, the authors hang on to how most MEPs prefer official roles in the 
Parliament. This, they argue, points to the relative lack of power of the parliamentarian 
groups. Moreover, the sticks belong to the national delegations and not to the group 
presidents: As is the case in ten out of 15 member states, party leaders may not remove 
MEPs from their committee, nor strip them of their committee tasks. Conversely, national 
parties are in absolute control over the lists allowing for reelection of MEPs to the 
Parliament.  
Mamadouh and Raunio hold that national delegations restrict the power of party 
groups inside the European Parliament (2003: 340-41). The “impressive levels of group unity 
during voting” is, in their view, insignificant compared to party groups’ relative lack of 
“ability to sanction and to reward representatives” (2003: 341). This leads them to argue 
that “in the EP committees, members are fairly autonomous of their party groups, but not 
necessarily of their national party delegations” (2003: 338). The heterogeneity of European 
caucuses imply, in their view, a committee based legislature.  
Nonetheless, most MEPs court positions for which they need the favors of the group. 
By these allocations, group leaders have quite a disciplinary tool – especially in the 
designation of rapporteurs. Reports are voted over in plenary under open rules, effectively 
giving the opportunity for the caucus to vote down propositions from unruly committee 
members (Hausemer, 2006: 513). This is in line with Cox’ and McCubbins’ conditions for 
partisan discipline. Mamadouh and Raunio consider, nevertheless, the caucus’ rights to be 
insufficient claiming the prevention of re-nomination would require the approval of the 
national delegation (2003: 340).   
The subsequent study sees report allocation as a repetitive game in which 
parliamentarian groups are able to impose credible sanctions on unruly group rapporteurs. 
As Simon Hix et al. point out:  
 
“Party organization constitutes a division-of-labor contract where “back-bench” MEPs 
provide labor and capital (working out the position of the party and gathering 
information on the issues on which they become specialized), and European party 
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group “leaders” distribute committee and party offices, communicate party 
positions, and enforce the terms of the party organization contract.” (2006: 496)  
 
Whereas committee assignments are done only twice per term, the assignment of reports is 
done all along the 5 years period. Draft allocations may therefore be considered a series of 
repeated games. If MEPs defect from the group contract during the first round, there is no 
reason for group leaders to give new reports in subsequent games. If aspirants to 
rapporteurships also aim for more reports after his reelection (by the blessings of the 
national party, certainly), the game is in fact indefinite.  
In the respects of this particular study of report allocation, the caucus does have 
quite important disciplinary tools and should be expected to use them to improve party 
group position.  
 
As revealed from this chapter, the EP has developed a small core of long-term 
parliamentarians. Despite high rates of turnover, previous literature generally assumes MEPs 
to seek reelection through committee work. The majority of authors also deem EP legislative 
organization to be set up to hold informational bargains. Most of the parliamentary work is 
indeed done in committees.  
Yet, the formal organization of legislative tasks revolves around caucuses equipped 
with the disciplinary tools to keep control of policy making. This does not imply, however, 
that within the framework of EP legislative organization other interests are not 
accommodated. Rather, legislative work is distributed in a consensual manner.  
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4 Face Value – A Consensual 
Organization 
Committee work is considered by all theories to be a means of reelection. To what degree, 
and in which policy domain MPs choose to engage are determined by his or her preferences 
as expressed through the ballot. How scholars choose to operationalize these interests vary 
nonetheless (4.1). Early studies of European legislative organization have tended to do 
descriptive analyses of the effects of geography and ideology, with only random references 
to theories of legislative organization. The results support a consensual view of report 
allocation (4.2).  
4.1 Mediation of Preferences 
Two empirical origins of preferences are distinguished in the American literature: The 
geographical and the party political. To what degree do they fit the situation on the Old 
Continent?  
4.1.1 Preferences in the American Literature 
A number of American scholars tend to presume legislators’ preferences to be 
geographically based. The operationalization makes sense in the American federal system 
where legislators are closely linked to their constituency.  
When Shepsle and Weingast furthermore assume as many policy dimensions (and 
thus policy preferences) as there are subjects to discuss, this gives no clues for empirical 
operationalizations. The partisan approach takes this one step further: Legislators may well 
group into common political parties on the account of common (exogenous) interests in a 
restricted number of policy dimensions, but when it comes to specific policy choices, their 
preferences may diverge. This is why caucuses delegate policy making on specific topics to a 
limited number of members who will defend the party line (Hausemer, 2006: 515). The 
informational game within the caucus – in combination with party discipline – ensures that 
once they have been elected, party members’ interests are endogenous (i.e. defined within 
the caucus). In this view, party discipline replaces the closed rules favored by Krehbiel to 
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avoid majority cycling. Informational theories on their part deem preferences to be fixed and 
exogenous in one single policy dimension. This is why Krehbiel refuses to consider political 
parties as a significant level of organization (1991: 101-102). Why bother with parties when 
you can study individual interests directly?  
Distributional and informational approaches are extensions of the American tradition 
of policy-blind theories, whereas the European literature assumes a limited number of 
policy-dimensions on which political parties are funded (Laver and Schofield, 1990). 
All theories rely on the assumption that members of the European Parliament 
actually seek reelection, and that they consider committee work to be a suitable means to 
this end. As we have already seen this is a somewhat bald assumption in the EP. How close 
are MEPs to their constituency? 
4.1.2 European Preferences 
The electoral connection is noticeably weaker in the European Union than what is the case in 
the States. Herman Schmitt qualifies European elections as second-order, arguing that 
“when democracies rest on a stable, consolidated party system, elections are all but 
independent events” (2005: 650). The public debate is vivid all through the legislative period. 
The result is an electoral cycle: In the first part of the period in office, government surfs on a 
wave of optimism, then its popularity tends to decrease before it improves once more 
towards the end of the mandate. This is not the case in the European Parliament. The public 
does not generally keep informed of the whereabouts of Parliament, and elections tend to 
reveal a logic of government-opposition on the national level. (Schmitt, 2005: 650-652). 
How, then, will the electorate know if the MEP has procured them with the benefits they 
may reasonably expect? Do European legislators invest in committee work on these 
premises?  
In a system of proportional representation and with large constituencies such as the 
European Parliament, the direct link to voters is considerably diluted: In the 2004 election 19 
out of 25 member states had national constituencies. This is a natural corollary to the raison 
d’être of the European Parliament which is not to form a stable government majority, but 
rather to represent major currents of opinion within the Community. Since the last 
recalcitrant states (i.e. the UK and Ireland) abandoned the “first past the post” system in 
32 
 
1999, all member states have opted for a more or less proportional ballot (Corbett, 2007: 
16-20).  
Even though legislative work in the EP is structured by transnational groups, 
reelection is controlled by national parties running for election. The party decides which 
candidates are to head the lists, and the focus on individual politicians tends to be 
somewhat lower. The electoral campaign is directed nationally, and national parties decide 
which European political group their MEPs will be joining. (Hix et al., 2006: 496) National 
delegations are all the more important as European elections are second-order, meaning 
national policies are better known than whatever goods MEPs may have provided for their 
constituents. As their direct link with the constituency weakens, MEPs’ dependency on 
national delegations increases. This should incite European parliamentarians to adopt the 
national party line. 
Yet, transnational caucuses are quite present in Parliament: Much of the legislative 
work is organized to fit political groups. Groups are decisive to the choice of President, Vice-
Presidents, and committee chairs. They choose rapporteurs, and organize the agenda and 
individual speaking time. MEPs are thus encouraged to “form themselves into groups 
according to their political affinities” (Rule 29). The criterion has been challenged in the past 
by the formation of a technical group of non-attached members. This was condemned by the 
Court, and although a new version of Rule 29-1 considers political affinity to be implicit in 
the act of formation, most groups do share a common ideological basis. (Corbett, 2007: 70-
71)  
This puts an extra strain on MEPs preferences. One has to satisfy a national party in 
order to be reelected, yet the arguments for reelections (i.e. the policies produced by the 
MEP) are provided within a system of transnational political groups.  
 
“All this shows that an individual MEP is faced with tough choices. An active member 
may well gain greater influence within the Parliament, with prestigious 
rapporteurships, and so on, but lose touch with his or her own political base at home, 
and risk not being re-elected.” (Corbett, 2007: 58) 
From this discussion, it is evident that the geographical link assumed in the American 
literature coincides with the national provenance of MEPs, and thereby with their affiliation 
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to a national party. The second-order nature of EP elections makes MEPs more dependent 
on their national delegations and less inclined to invest in committee work in view of 
reelection. Legislative work is, on the other hand, organized by transnational caucuses who 
are formed along a policy dimension which does not necessarily concur with national 
concerns. How does the EP solve the tension between ideological representation and the 
geographical requirements of a supranational parliament in the making?  
4.2 Bivariate preliminaries – Consensual 
Distribution 
Previous research has shown the group of rapporteurs is roughly proportional to both the 
national and ideological composition of the chamber. (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Mamadouh 
and Raunio, 2003; Benedetto, 2005; McElroy, 2006) This substantiates a European 
multiparty model in which rapporteurs are co-opted by their pairs in a highly consensual 
manner. Preliminary results thus agree with the general view that EP legislative organization 
follows an informational rationale (Hb1), although with a specific European twist. 
4.2.1 Political Groups – Informational View with a European Twist 
One of the fundamental prerequisites for the informational rationale is that key-legislators 
are chosen in a majority vote. Political questions take place in an essentially unidimensional 
space in which the median voter has a quasi-dictatorial decisional power. Two or more 
dimensions would, argues Krehbiel, lead to majority cycling.  
According to William Riker (1962) alliances should be “minimal winning” majorities 
which satisfy two conditions: The coalition has absolute majority and it involves a minimal 
number of coalition partners. Subsequent theorists have added a third condition in which 
coalition partners also should share similar preferences so that coalitions are “minimal 
connected winning” majorities (Axelrod, 1970). The assumption is reasonable for the 
American two-party system in which one party detains more than half the seats, and 
therefore reaps highly disproportional benefits from its position.  
In the European context researchers have expected a similar grand coalition between 
the only two parties who are able to muster more than 50% of the chamber votes (PES and 
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PPE). Along with this literature, high majority thresholds have prevented the usual left-right 
cleavage of party politics. Instead, the main policy dimension is assumed to be institutional. 
A “grand coalition” should therefore be formed in order for the EP to assert its position 
against the Council and the Commission (Bardi, 1994; Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix and Kreppel, 
2003, Benedetto, 2005 quoted in Hausemer, 2006: 513).  
Subsequent research has to some extent revalorized the traditional left-right politics in 
the EU. In their study of voting patterns of the European Parliament since the 1979 election, 
Hix, Noury and Roland identify two dimensions predicting roughly 90% of all votes in the 
assembly. The first dimension they classify as a left-right cleavage, whereas the second 
dimension corresponds more or less to a pro-anti European attitude. (Hix et al., 2006: 498-
99). In this case, an alliance between socialists and conservatives along the main policy 
cleavage is unlikely. 
In the European literature politics tend to be policy-driven, insisting more on the need 
for representation of different interests rather than accumulation of power. In the presence 
of several policy dimensions, majorities tend to change according to the policy issue at hand 
(Laver and Schofield, 1990). Patterns of recurrent cooperation will tend to form along the 
main political cleavage in the chamber. Yet, Parliament’s initial representative role does not 
require the discipline of a stable coalition. In its absence, no party group should reap highly 
disproportional benefits across allocations.  
Report allocation in the EP is done on a subject basis. Policy space is limited to two major 
dimensions, and political groups are sufficiently disciplined and limited in number to avoid 
majority cycling during the adoption of drafts. The system of open rules satisfies the 
majoritarian prerequisite, yet the MEP responsible for the draft is allowed to negotiate deals 
with the partners of his own choice. As the game is repetitive, caucuses have little incentives 
to defect from their agreement. The proportional system of points which governs the 
allocation process can in fact be seen as an institutionalized response to limit lengthy 
discussions of who will handle dossiers. The process allows European caucuses to bid on 
policy issues which are salient to them (Hausemer, 2006); in effect, exchanging apples for 
oranges. Party group discipline and exchanges across policy areas replace Krehbiel’s 
expectation of closed rules.  
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The multiparty system may be seen as a permanent grand coalition which includes all 
groups. The cooperative mood facilitates the formation of over-sized majorities in 
institutional questions where MEPs all share interests. In case of conflict MEPs meet with 
national party colleagues in Council. Majorities which includes all political caucuses and 
nationalities give thereby an extra leverage to the institution. As the debate turns towards 
ideological questions, coalitions tend to become smaller.   
In the multiparty context of the European Parliament the informational hypothesisb1 
should thereby imply a proportional distribution of legislative drafts. From the data on 
reports drawn during the last 30 years, these expectations are largely corroborated. 
Correlation between party group size and representation among rapporteurs is, indeed, 
extremely high: Between 96% and 99% of the variation in the distribution of reports can be 
explained by the size of the caucus.  
In their study of the 3rd and 4th elective period (1989-99) Mamadouh and Raunio also 
observe a high degree of correlation between group size and the acquired number of 
reports, though somewhat lower than this. Yet, they argue, “in general, the larger groups 
were over-represented (especially EPP) while the smaller ones were under-represented” 
(2003: 246). This is hardly the case in the extended study. 
The EPP and the PES detain between 54% and 66% of the seats during all six periods. Yet, 
whereas the EPP is indeed significantly over-represented from the 3rd period on, the 
socialists are only once. The bivariate distribution of reports does not reflect any grand 
coalition. The allotment seems to the contrary to be essentially consensual.   
Figure 4.1 shows the smaller party groups are indeed under-represented. No wonder, 
Hausemer remarks, as the smaller parties are to be found in the extremes of the left-right 
political spectrum (2006: 519). He thereby adopts a narrow conception of the informational 
hypothesis in which trusted legislators should not deviate much from the median voter at 
the floor.  
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According to Hix, the left-right alliance did in fact peak in the 3rd parliament and has since 
diminished in impact. “There has been growing competition between the centre-left and the 
centre-right in the last few European Parliaments (Hix, 2009: 1-2). Hausemer (2006) thereby 
expects coalitions rather to form along the left-right axis in the EP. In his study of the first 
half of the 5th period, he finds that the PPE and ELDR groups obtain more than their share of 
salient reports. The tendency shown in figure 4.1 is similar and even more pronounced 
during the 6th legislature. These two groups, explains Hausemer, are politically close and 
should be expected to cooperate.  
Without disentangling alternative coalition-formations in Parliament, it is evident from 
the bivariate distribution that differences in participation among groups have become more 
pronounced during the period. Whereas no single caucus obtained an over-representation 
of five points or more during the 1st and the 2nd parliaments, differences are quite 
pronounced during the 6th legislature, with a marked advantage of the centre-right. The 
discrepancies in representation witness differences in the strategies across party groups. The 
trend has moreover become more pronounced from the 3rd parliament on. This can be cut 
down to differences in individual strategies. 
In the present distribution there is indeed an over-representation of the centre-right 
during the period, including the PPE and two medium sized liberal groups. The groups are 
politically close, and have had overlaps in memberships.  In 1992 PPE merged with the 
European Democrats (ED). Up to this date there had been written 1035 reports, 26% of 
which were drawn by members of the EPP. Yet, their relative over-representation did not 
obtain statistical significance before the merger. On the other hand, ED members had 
written 9,5% of the total number of reports, making for a significant 2,9% over-
representation of ED members. 
Figure 4.1: Relative Over/Under-Representation by Political Group 
Zero units on the y-axis expresses perfect correlation between group size and reports 
allocated to the caucus. Political groups are ranged by size. If large parties had been over-
represented and smaller parties had been under-represented, the bars would have 
followed a decreasing line. 
Significance level: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 98%. 
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A similar phenomenon takes place when the ALDE group is formed in 2004 from the 
previous ELDR and certain members from the EPP. It is interesting to note that 
rapporteurships from the liberal group are significantly over-represented only after this 
fusion.  
Some individuals obtain more reports than others. Legislative representation of the 
group much depends on its capacity to put these members to use. The overall pattern of the 
data corroborates the informational predictions of hypothesisb1. The group of key-legislators 
reflects the preferences of the chamber in such a way that the floor majority can approve of 
it.  
What is more, as the procedures of appointment already indicated, MEPs non-affiliated 
to any political group have no group leader to defend their interests. They are not, it seems, 
included in the organizational consensus. Figure 4.3 shows how independent members are 
constantly under-represented among rapporteurs. Quite along the expectations of the 
partisan view; caucuses are central players in European parliamentary politics.    
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Figure 4.2: Transition of MEPs Between Conservative Groups: 
The figure shows the relative over/under-representation of party groups among 
rapporteurs during the six legislative periods under consideration. 
The PPE merged with the European Democrats on the 1st of May 1992, during the 
3rd legislature. Similarly, the ALDE group of the 6th legislature (here represented in the 
ELDR barplot) was formed by MEPs from the previous ELDR group and a number of 
members of the PPE. 
Significance level: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 98%. 
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4.2.2 Member States – Leaders and Laggards 
Even though the intergovernmental composition of the Council has justified comparisons 
with the upper house of a federal system (e.g. First Council President Konrad Adenauer 
quoted in Corbett, 2007: 204; Lijphart, 1999), observers have commented on the importance 
of a good spread in national representation also in Parliament, thus combining national 
concerns with the ideological representation of political groups (Corbett, 2007: 25-29).  
From what is seen in previous research the distribution of reports should reflect a 
parallel power structure of national delegations. Mamadouh and Raunio find that “again, the 
shares of reports were broadly proportional to seat distribution.” This is sufficient for the 
researchers to conclude that “the principles guiding committee work are thus really no 
different from the internal work of the party groups, with the accommodation of national 
interests crucial in building group positions” (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 347, 349). 
Yet, the correlation is somewhat lower than for political groups. During the two 
periods studied by Mamadouh and Raunio 78% and 79% of the variation in nationality is 
explained by the size of the national delegation. The correlation is stronger in the beginning 
EP legislative period
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 o
v
e
r-
/u
n
d
e
r 
re
p
re
s
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
-5
0
5
1
0
**
***
***
***
***
Independents
EP1 
EP2 
EP3 
EP4 
EP5 
EP6 
Figure 4.3 Representation of Independent MEPs: 
The figure shows the relative over- and under-representation of MEPs who are 
independent of any groups during the six legislative periods under consideration. This 
includes non-attached members as well as members of technical groups. 
Significance level: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 98%. 
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and the end of the 30 years period considered here. During the 1st legislature 96% of the 
variation could be explained by the size of the national groups, reaching a low during the 
1990-ies. But by 2004 the figure had increased back up to 93%.  
This time, Mamadouh and Raunio do not expect the larger national groups to 
coordinate in such a way as to receive a greater amount of reports than their due. This is 
indeed not the case; Germany – holding the largest amount of seats – is over-represented. 
But this is hardly the case for the United Kingdom, France and Italy. To explain the residue, 
the authors decide rather to engage in a series of ad-hoc explanations (2003: 346-48). 
Figure 4.4 represents the relative under- and over-representation of member states 
among rapporteurs. Certain states distinguish themselves clearly from the proportional 
prediction. France and Italy are largely under-represented, even though this changed during 
the 2004-09 period. Mamadouh and Raunio suggest three explanations for this deviance. 
There are fewer French and Italian MEPs in the larger groups than what their number of 
seats should indicate. As members of smaller groups or independents, it is not surprising 
French and Italian rapporteurs are rare (2003: 347). 
The researchers then put forward two cultural factors for the low level of activity. 
First, they deem proficiency in English to be of importance. Relying on common prejudices, 
they explain the under-representation of Italian, French, Greek and Portuguese MEPs by 
their supposed communication problems. Conversely, the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Netherlands are quoted as over-represented and proficient in English. (2003: 347) 
Considering the whole period of 30 years, this does not hold true. Neither the UK nor Ireland 
are over-represented over a longer period; remains only the least proficient of the three. 
Netherlands are generally and significantly more prone to write reports than what its size 
should indicate. 
The third reason which advanced for the French and Italian idleness is a more 
academic one. Both countries have a long tradition of holding several offices simultaneously 
at the local, regional or national level (2003: 348). Previous to the 1979 election this was 
quite common among nominated MEPs (Corbett, 1998: 66). According to a study done by 
Dewoghélaëre et al., in 2003 43,7% of all French MEPs held at least one local office. Yet Italy 
(19,5%) ranges only fifth after Luxembourg (33,3%), Belgium (20%) and Ireland (20%), and 
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just before Austria, Finland and Sweden. None of these nationalities distinguish themselves 
as less inclined to write reports.  
 
            
            
                
Figure 4.4: RelativeOver/Under-Representation of the Original 9 
Member States from 1979 
The figure shows a chronological presentation of relative over- or under-
representation among rapporteurs during the six legislative periods in 
question. The 0 on the y-axis expresses perfect representation according 
to the size of the national delegation. 
Significance level: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 98%. 
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New member states tend to be less represented among key-legislators than what the size of 
their national contingent should imply. Considering figure 4.5, all of the 18 new national 
arrivals since the 1979 election (with the exception of Slovenia) start their first period below 
the bar of perfect proportionality. Is this really a question of nationality, or do all freshmen 
find it just as hard to acquire reports?  
More generally, figures 4.4 and 4.5 indicate differences in strategies, just as was 
observed among transnational groups. The distributions certainly give weight to Mamadouh 
and Raunio’s claim that national parties are important players in the EP system.  
 
MEPs’ direct link with their constituency is largely supplemented by national party 
delegations. These delegations are organized in transnational caucuses according to their 
common ideological preferences. Similarly, the two main policy dimensions in Parliament 
reflect concerns on the left-right axis and the national-supranational dynamic. In case of 
conflict MEPs are faced with hard choices which cannot be clearly predicted by theory.  
Yet, instead of entering the stalemate where Mamadouh and Raunio have found 
themselves, I will in the following explore to what extent the European Parliament has 
organized itself according to general predictions of legislative theories; without deciding 
which of the transnational and national groups are the strongest. In most cases, preferences 
overlap; just as the majority of votes reflect the left-right dimension.  
  Preliminary results show legislative preparations are organized on an institutional 
level to accommodate not only a simple majority of the chamber, but all players. The 
ensuing report allocations are done by majority votes, however, and may be more 
competitive in nature. Their informational organization will be more thoroughly tested later. 
The informational hypothesisb1 is corroborated at the expense of the distributional approach 
Figure 4.5: Relative Over/Under-Representation of New Member States 
The figure shows a chronological representation of relative over- or under-representation 
among rapporteurs. Most nationalities start their membership under the bar of perfect 
representation.  
Most new members entered the EP during a legislative period. The present figure 
expresses the proportion of reports presented after the accession of new member states.  
Significance level: * 90%; ** 95%; *** 98%. 
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(Ha1); although with some modifications inspired both from the latter and the partisan 
approach.  
The subsequent statistical analyses with further explore which strategies of selection 
are used during report allocations.   
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5 Operationalizations – Adopting A 
European View 
Have the careful mediation between national delegations and caucuses prevented the EP 
from organizing itself in an effective manner? To what extent does a traditional model of 
legislative organization fit to the European reality?    
 To answer these questions I will trace the outlines of a theory on European legislative 
organization (5.1). To test the theory, I will then adapt previously defined hypotheses to the 
empirical requirements so as to distinguish indicators for the explanatory variables defined 
by theory (5.2).  
5.1 What to Model? 
5.1.1 Theoretical Outline – An Ordinary Assembly? 
NOMINATE scores are constructed from voting patterns (“yes”/”no”/”abstain”) and have no 
immediate substantial meaning. To find one, Hix et al regress the distinguished policy 
dimensions on several political indicators.  
They find that “the main observed dimension of voting in the European Parliament is 
the same as the main dimension of domestic politics in Europe.” What is more, “EU policies 
of national parties and national party participation in government are only significant 
without the European party group dummies. This means that once one controls for 
European party group positions these variables are not relevant explanatory factors on the 
first dimension.” This is also the case for member state dummies. (Hix et al., 2006: 502) 
Voting coherence in the EP among party groups, the authors claim, is actually stronger than 
in the US Congress.  
 Are Hix’ observations on voting patterns reflected in the legislative work prior to 
voting? If the EP has developed in the direction of an ordinary assembly, preparations of bills 
should be predictable by other variables than nationality. This is why the following study will 
concentrate on tendencies which are observed across party groups and national delegations.    
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Yet, as the preliminary discussion around career paths have already revealed, some 
European specificities have remained: Incentives to legislative work may only apply to parts 
of the MEPs.  
The fundamental assumption in all three theories reviewed in this study implies that 
parliamentarians are eager to engage in committee work in order to ensure reelection. This 
might not hold true – both because some MEPs do not seek reelection and because their 
reelection does not necessarily depend upon the benefits provided in Parliament. Corbett 
(1998: 66-67), Scarrow (1997: 253-55) and Mamadouh and Raunio (2003: 346-48) have 
several suggestions as to why some MEPs do not engage in committee work. Yet, because 
this study set out to discern theoretical criteria for rapporteur selection, the two groups will 
be distinguished without actually seeking to do a complete theoretical analysis as to why 
some MEPs choose to opt out. Subsequent research would much enrich the perspective with 
a more thorough analysis of the characteristics of non-rapporteurs. Its approach would be 
the inverse of what is done presently and could readily be merged with the theory at hand. 
 As the review of existing literature on the subject has already revealed, most authors 
consider the EP to be the scene of an informational game. Notwithstanding the influence of 
national delegations, party groups are able to provide benefits for their members and 
organize their work effectively to defend their shared reputation. This results in an 
informational two-level game. The informational game will therefore be tested on two 
planes; both in the negotiations between groups and in the organization within groups:  
The strict interpretation of the majority rule implies that the majority of the floor 
selects their representatives in committees. Bargains between caucuses should in the 
European context lead the group of rapporteurs to reflect the political composition of the 
floor; without a particularly favorable distribution for the chamber majority and at least 
some representation of all currents of thoughts. The informational game within party groups 
is subject to much the same underlying principles. Caucuses select their representatives on 
the account of the group, and wish therefore rapporteurs to act according to group 
recommendations. Expertise is crucial at both levels, and can at least to some extent be 
traded against representativeness. As Corbett has already pointed out, this is also true for 
exchanges across levels; recognized specialists may be valuable arguments during 
negotiations between party groups. 
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As the impact of Parliament increases, the criteria of rapporteur selection defined by 
the informational and partisan approaches should become harsher. The relative insistence 
on each criterion may however change according to the special demands of the task at hand. 
The theoretical outline should therefore become more pronounced throughout the 30 years 
under study. Similarly will the elite among rapporteurs be trusted with more reports in 
legislative procedures which grant increased influence of the chamber. 
Through this outline, four elements will be operationalized and tested: Some 
indicators are chosen so as to measure the general activity of individual MEPs, considering 
this to be the best way to filter out Parliament’s free-riders. The adverse informational and 
distributive expectations of representativeness of the floor (Ha1-b1) will be further tested. 
Third, are there signs of legislative specialization as predicted by the informational approach 
(Hb2)? And last, do transnational party groups corroborate the partisan perspective?  
Whereas previous researchers have been forced to draw general conclusions from 
small selections of data (e.g. Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003), the 
present study is limited by the validity of the chosen indicators rather than selection bias. 
Falsifying the study requires not a new selection of observations from the same period of 
time, but a new selection of variables. This is why following analyses will experiment with 
several alternative indicators. 
5.1.2 The Response Variable – Measuring Influence 
With the exception of potential free-riders, MEPs are expected to engage in a competition 
for increased influence. Whereas Hausemer (2006) expects the degree of salience of reports 
to be a function of the policy domain which allows MEPs to procure benefits for their 
particular electorate, this study models legislators who maximize influence by the 
accumulation of legislative drafts. The two approaches are potentially compatible. 
The theoretical outline will be tested on two different response variables 
corresponding to two different measures of influence.  
The Quantitative Accumulation of Draft Legislation 
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Draft legislation in the EP is most of the time expressed in reports. Legislative work – and 
thereby legislative influence – is much contained in the drawing and the adoption of reports. 
The simplest reasoning implies that the more reports you write the more influence you gain.  
The 1st analysis will thereby concentrate on the quanta of reports acquired by MEPs 
during each legislature, considering all reports to be of equal value. The variable is deduced 
from an initial list of all reports presented during the legislature as well as the identity of the 
rapporteur. The response variable in the first statistical models expresses thus the number 
of reports written by each MEP during his period.  
Increased Competition for the More Salient Reports 
The powers of the European Parliament have changed over the years, and its influence 
varies greatly among policy domains. Certain procedures (related to given policy areas) give 
Parliament more leverage in relations with both the Council and the Commission than 
others. Such reports yield more power to the rapporteur and should thereby be more 
attractive. The second analysis thereby tests the same theoretical model on the distribution 
of reports considered to be salient. The response variable in the second analysis expresses 
the number of reports acquired under the most salient procedures available during the 
legislature.   
 Exactly what procedures are the most attractive vary as the EP has gained in 
influence: As is typical for any parliamentarian assembly, the EP has a reinforced position 
during budget proceedings. This has been the case during the entire period under study 
(Corbett, 2007: 248). The 1980 Isoglucose act also recognized a delaying veto to the EP 
during consultation. This was at the time a major break-through in the quest for 
parliamentarian influence (Corbett, 2007: 204-211). In the first legislature budget and 
consultation procedures are thereby considered salient compared to other reports.  
The Single European Act (1986) improved Parliament’s position further by 
introducing a second reading to consultation. The treaty also established the assent 
procedure in which the Council needs the consent of Parliament to proceed with legislation. 
(Corbett, 2007: 213, 230-32). In the second period reports allocated before July 1987 are 
considered salient if they are of a budgetary or consultational nature (as during the first 
period). For all reports allocated after July 1987 assent and cooperation procedures (as well 
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as budget resolutions, but not consultations) imply more parliamentarian influence than 
usual.  
From the third legislature on, reports allocated under assent, budget, cooperation 
and co-decision procedures are considered salient. The Maastricht Treaty (1992) introduced 
a third reading through the first version of the co-decision procedure. The following 10 years 
of academic studies were much concerned with the actual impact of this reform as well as its 
subsequent revisions. The possibility for the Council to over-rule Parliament and the 
requirement of qualified majorities in the final stage of a conflict were considered to be an 
obstacle to the authority of the elected body. (e.g. Crombez 1996, 2001; Moser 1996; 
Rittberger 2000; Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 1994, 2000, 2001, 2002) Yet, in Richard 
Corbett’s opinion the status as a junior partner has not prevented Parliament from 
becoming a co-legislator to the Council: 
 
“However, the impact of Parliament is not just a question of whether or not 
legislation is finally adopted. Both in quantitative and in qualitative terms, Parliament 
has made a significant difference to the shape of Community legislation, a difference 
that goes well beyond what could have been achieved under either the consultation 
or cooperation procedures. Co-decision has created a new dynamic within the 
legislative arena of the European Union.” (Corbett, 2007: 225-26)   
 
The procedure has been revised several times since to improve Parliament’s position and 
has with time largely supplemented the cooperation procedure. Its exact impact is not 
crucial, as the primary interest in the present is the relative power of the assembly in 
particular procedures. Yet, as the institution’s position strengthens, the competition for 
reports should become crisper. Differences among rapporteurs should therefore become 
more pronounced from the 3rd period on.    
From this definition, the distribution of salient reports among rapporteurs is quite 
similar to the general trend in report allocation. As was already seen in the introduction to 
this study, between 29% and 60% of all MEPs never drew any reports at all during the 
legislature (figure 1). Likewise, among those who acquired reports during the period, some 
29% to 58% never prepared legislation which fell under the more important procedures. 
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5.1.3 Choice of Statistical Model 
The selection of observations is as broad as it can get. Some studies of committee 
assignments have done a separate analysis of each committee in question, arguing that the 
jurisdiction and criteria of selection are too different to allow for any global trends to appear 
in an overall study. (McElroy, 2006; Yordanova, 2009) McElroy also chooses to do separate 
examination of the two large party groups, much for the same reasons. Opposing trends 
may mask each other and leave the researcher in confusion as to the actual principles of 
organization.  
The present study expects there are general patterns of organization which may be 
explained by existing theories. Trends are sought across all party groups and committees, 
supposing some expectations are generally applicable. The data consequently include all 
MEPs. Subsequent research may then enlarge the perspective by more qualitative studies of 
the differences in committee organizations (in line with Yordanova, 2009) or differential 
strategies in legislative participation among party groups (as in Hausemer, 2006) or member 
states (as done by Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003).  
The very point of this study is to distinguish what the elite of rapporteurs has in 
common. As an illustration, 60% of the MEPs in the 6th legislature wrote no reports at all, 
whereas 2% of the members accumulated 11 or more drafts. By consequence, data should 
be naturally overdispersed with a variance much greater than the mean frequency of 
reports.   
Because the response variable in the following models is the number of reports 
written by each MEP, data points do not have any natural (upward) limit, and it is not based 
on a number of independent trials. An MEP who has once been deemed fit for the job is 
likely to be selected once again later on. Specialization increases for every report written. In 
these cases it is custom to use the Poisson regression model or one of its overdispersed 
generalizations such as negative binomial models (Gelman and Hill, 2007: 112). 
The primary choice of model in this study is thus a negative binomial model with 
loglink. The negative binomial distribution expresses the discrete distribution of successes 
(non-acquisition of reports) obtained in a sequence of Bernoulli trials before a specified 
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number of failures (acquisition of reports) occurs. The model supplement ordinary count 
models when Poisson estimation is inappropriate due to overdispersion. Estimates in these 
cases would be over-confident. Standard errors are biased downward causing spuriously 
large z-values.  
The robustness of the results in this rather simple model will then be tested against 
alternative models developed much for the same type of data distributions.  
5.2 Explanatory variables – How to Capture a 
European Organization? 
To draw a portrait of the EP as an ordinary assembly (and not as a supranational ad hoc 
construction), a number of indicators are derived and operationalized from the theoretical 
outline of European legislative organization.  
5.2.1 Indicators of an Informational Two-Level Game 
Whereas both the distributional and the informational approaches expect MEPs to specialize 
(hypothesisb2), the informational theory requires the floor to keep control of legislative 
assignations so that expertise is acquired for the benefit of the chamber as a whole. The co-
optation among colleagues implied in hypothesisb1 was already put to the test during the 
preliminary study of chapter 4: Report allocation is mainly dictated by a consensual view. In 
the present hypothesisb1 will be tested once more by an indicator of rapporteurs’ distance 
from the floor median voter on the main policy dimension.  
The same goes for the informational implications of a partisan perspective in which 
the caucus ensures party group representatives are loyal. Three indicators will then test 
hypothesisc1 which expresses the capacity of transnational groups to organize a second 
selection within the caucus to meet informational demands. Their existence is only justified 
if this provides more benefits for their members than what is the case for non-affiliated 
MEPs (hypothesisc2). 
Do MEPs Specialize?  – Hypothesisb2 
Previous Terms Served – A Propriate Indicator of Expertise? 
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MEPs are expected to specialize in order to gain influence in the policy area of their choice.  
The informational approach expects acknowledged policy experts to be selected by 
their pairs. This requires some familiarity with the European institution, both in order to 
obtain expertise, and to be known for having what is required. However, the relationship 
may not be linear: The longer you have stayed in Parliament may not imply more reports.  
Incumbency is a means of measuring experience with the political craft as it is done 
in the EP. The “terms in the EP” variable measures how many consecutive periods the MEP 
has served in office since the 1979 election. 0 means the parliamentarian is a freshman, 1 
indicates that he or she served at least some time in the previous period, and so on. In the 
primary fit the variable is factorized in order to assess the linearity of the relationship, 
putting 0 as a baseline for every other category to be compared to. For obvious reasons, the 
variable is not included in the analysis of the 1st period. 
If there is a positive relationship between incumbency and amount of reports, the 
informational hypothesisb2 is upheld. 
 
Incumbency in Committees – A Better Indicator of Specialization? 
As national parties are in charge of the re-nomination of incumbent MEPs, the work done in 
committees may not necessarily be a major argument in the selection of candidates. French 
and Italian accumulation of mandates also indicates how national delegates are selected for 
considerations outside Parliament (i.e. their position in national politics). Staying in 
Parliament year in and year out might simply be a comfortable leisure which does not imply 
any ambitions within the EP. 
 Committees have defined jurisdictions and their number and type tend to be rather 
constant across periods. Specialization within specific policy domains may therefore be 
acquired through committee work. A second variable is thus included which expresses 
whether the MEP stayed on at least one of the same committees across two periods. The 
second fit will control committee incumbency against the continuous reelection to 
Parliament in order to assess both the degree and the nature of professionalization among 
the European elite. 
The model on salient reports includes only rapporteurs. The definition of incumbency 
has therefore been further restricted to committee incumbent rapporteurs who wrote at 
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least one report during the last legislature. Non-rapporteurs from the previous legislature 
are not considered incumbent. The indicator therefore includes both an element of policy 
expertise and previous experience with the drawing of reports. 
 If committee incumbency is positively correlated to the accumulation of reports, the 
informational hypothesesb2 is further corroborated.  
Whereas the first indicator of specialization simply expresses experience with the 
political game proper to the EP, committee incumbency also implies a certain specialization 
in a policy field. In view of the increasingly detailed nature of European legislation, policy 
specific expertise is more valuable to the institution than any random familiarity with the 
European political life. In a rational selection of rapporteurs committee experience should 
prevail over simple long-termers.  
Are Rapporteurs Representative of Floor Preferences? – The Alternative 
Hypothesesa1-b1 
As the preliminary bivariate analysis has already shown, floor selection is done in two stages: 
At the institutional stage, political groups have agreed to a system of proportional 
representation. During the second stage report allocation becomes competitive; groups are 
free to exchange influence in an auction-like manner. In view of the system of open rules 
under which reports are voted at the floor level, the group of rapporteurs should reflect the 
political preferences of the median voter in Parliament.  
Hix’ NOMINATE scores on the first dimension measure individual preferences as 
expressed by voting patterns. The scores will be used to test the alternative hypothesis a1 
and b1. The original scale ranges from -1 to 1, with 0 as a central measure in the chamber 
and -1 and 1 as measures of voting extremists on the left-wing and right-wing respectively. 
In the present analyses the scale is recoded to absolute values so that distance is calculated 
from the floor median with 1 as the outer limit of political outliers when the floor median is 
set at 0.  
If the floor majority has kept control over draft legislation (Hb1), the correlation 
between number of reports written and political preferences should be negative. If self-
selection by outliers turns out to be dominant (Ha1), the relationship should turn out to be 
positive. 
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5.2.2   Partisan Expectations – Hypothesisc1-c2 
Three indicators test the efficacious informational organization of transnational parties (Hc1) 
Then, a particular variable on party group affiliation is constructed to test both the presence 
of a grand coalition across the main ideological cleavage and the importance of party group 
affiliation (Hc2).  
Does Shared Reputation Lead to Division of Labor? – Hypothesisc1 
Are Rapporteurs Representative for the Voting Preferences of their Group? 
In order for the informational and the partisan approach to be compatible, the faction of key 
legislators has to reflect not only the central tendency of the chamber, but also the central 
tendency of the group preferences. In the distributive rationale, self-selection among 
preference outliers in one party would provoke other parties to stack their quota with 
preference outliers in the other direction in order to pull the political consensus to a 
favorable outcome. The result would still be a group of key-legislators who reflect the floor 
median voter (Krehbiel, 1993: 243-245). The partisan perspective requires on the other hand 
party representatives to have preferences close to their caucus. 
In order to test the partisan hypothesisc1, the median NOMINATE score on the first 
dimension is calculated for each party group. Then the absolute distance between each 
MEPs individual score and the party group median is expressed. If the partisan hypothesisc1 
holds and party group officials where to prefer loyal group members, the correlation should 
be negative. The further away the parliamentarians’ voting scores are from the group mean, 
the smaller is the number of reports written.  
Non-affiliated members are considered to be independent of all party political groups in 
this particular study. In the case of independent MEPs it makes no sense to speak of the 
distance from the group median. Their scores are therefore simply replaced by the mean 
score distance in all groups and have no substantial meaning. 
 There have been arguments that party group discipline prevents MEPs from 
expressing their true preferences during voting (e.g. McElroy, 2006: 19). This debate is 
interesting, yet it has been disregarded in the present, as selection should be done according 
to the loyalty observed by MEP behavior rather than their unexpressed opinions on the 
matter. 
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Considering the high turnover rates in the EP, political groups may have little 
information about the loyalty of new members. But, since report allocation is done 
throughout the entire period, the assumption that group leaders consider voting patterns 
when appointing their rapporteurs is somewhat less of an anachronism than what 
Yordanova had to assume for her study of committee assignments at the beginning of the 6th 
legislature. (Yordanova, 2009: 267) 
 
Division of Labor in View of Expertise 
As Hix, Noury and Roland already have pointed out; parliamentarian groups are formed 
according to an idea of division of labor between group leaders and rank-and-file members. 
It is not necessarily the work provided by any individual MEP which is determinant for his or 
her electoral success. If selected rapporteurs are lithe negotiators and agile experts within 
their policy field they improve the collective gains of the group. Group leaders have thereby 
strong incentives to delegate tasks to the most competent members rather than using their 
position to acquire the most drafts themselves. 
The variable “Group Leader” has simple rank and file members as a reference level, 
whereas the chair and vice-chair in each caucus are considered to be group leaders. If the 
group solidarity is sufficient for its members to consider a common (electoral) destiny, group 
leaders should in any case not write more reports than others. 
 
New Member States – A Spurious Relationship? 
MEPs from new member states are a special case of inexperienced rapporteurs. They do, a 
fortiori, start out with a handicap, as they have had less time to obtain European expertise. 
What is more, the successive enlargements of the EU have been done disregarding the EP 
electoral calendar so that MEPs from new member states have less time to acquire and 
write reports1. When controlling for the previous experience of each individual MEP as well 
as the length of each mandate, do parliamentarians from new member states still obtain 
fewer drafts?  
Since MEPs are organized in transnational groups rather than by national delegations, 
freshmen should in principle have the same possibilities to acquire information whatever 
                                                 
1
 The bivariate analysis did in fact control for this limited time, yet found new member states to be under-
represented anyhow. What is new in the multivariate regression is the control for previous experience.  
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their national origin. Organization by national delegation would a contrario perpetrate the 
national handicap. Including a dummy for new member states is therefore a good test of 
caucuses’ capacity to integrate MEPs into the transnational system. 
The analysis of the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 6th periods include a binary variable coded as 1 if 
the individual comes from a member state which has joined the EC during the period, and 
otherwise coded as 0. 2 
Engaging in committee work requires time. The longer you stay in Parliament, the 
more reports you are able to write. As more MEPs pass through the European Parliament 
than in ordinary legislatures, it is necessary to control for length of tenure. All MEPs who 
have stayed less than three months in parliament are excluded from the regressions, 
assuming that the time is insufficient to acquire, write and present a report. A factorized 
variable “Years in Term” expresses furthermore the time measured in years during which the 
MEP have been in Parliament in the present legislature. The reference level consists of those 
who have stayed less than one year in office. Logically, the correlation of this control 
variable should be linear and positive.  
If – after examination of all the above mentioned indicators – hypothesesb1 and c1 are 
corroborated, the expectation of a two-level informational game is substantiated. 
What Group Affiliation Is Important? – Hypothesisc2 
By all accounts, politics in the EP are consensual, and as already seen, parliamentarian group 
size matters greatly in the allocation of reports.  
It is not the intention here to undertake an exhaustive analysis of coalition 
formations in the EP. The following statistical models do not include separate dummies for 
party groups as it has been done both in the study of committee assignments (Yordanova, 
2009) and report allocation (Hausemer, 2006). Instead, a nominal variable has been 
constructed which expresses the type of party group to which the MEP is affiliated. The 
construction allows further testing of the results found during the bivariate analysis. 
The position of the EP within the EC system depends on its capacity to distinguish 
exceptional circumstances in which it has to affirm its position as an institution, and the 
                                                 
2
 The 10 new member states which adhered to the union in May 2004 at the end of the 5
th
 legislature are 
excluded from the analysis of this period.  
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more trivial situations in which ideological debates should prevail. The increased 
parliamentarian leverage would be irrelevant if representation of the European electorate 
did not reflect the left-right concerns which dominate the bulk of political debates 
elsewhere. A grand coalition between PES and PPE would quell the ideological debate within 
the EP. 
Another aspect of the same debate is the position of system-critics in the EP. Krehbiel 
emphasizes that “theories of legislative organization have distinctly different empirical 
implications at each of two observable levels of legislative choice: the policies enacted by 
legislatures and the institutions developed and employed by legislatures.”  (Krehbiel, 1991: 
7) Any legislative organization requires the support of its members. In the EP there is a 
current of system-critical representatives. Representatives from eurosceptic groups are 
scarcely likely to represent the institutional interests of most members of the floor. Does this 
hold even in a parliamentary debate which according to Hix is essentially encompassed by 
the left-right dimension? In a representative system which has come to maturity system-
critics are mostly absorbed by, and expressed within, the system itself. As the main debate 
concerns policy rather than institutional questions, refusing to participate is equivalent to 
loosing influence. Is this the case in the European Parliament? 
Both the status of system-critics and the presence of a grand-coalition in the day-to-
day workings of the assembly are in fact tests of the capacity of the EP to function as a 
hybrid.  
Instead of constructing a variable with group affiliation as such, MEPs may in this 
analysis belong to one out of four categories: Large party groups (PES or PPE), medium sized 
party groups, independent members (technical groups included) or eurosceptic groups 
(including national conservatives and anti-European caucuses). Medium sized party groups 
are taken as the reference level in such a way that all other groups medium sized caucuses.  
Yordanova did a similar test in her study of committee assignments, leading her to 
conclude that affiliation with a big party group does not affect committee assignments 
disproportionately” (2009: 274). In the present model, the test is somewhat stricter. 
Whereas Yordanova created dummies for PPE-ED and PES, the group variable has extracted 
the less active non-affiliated members and eurosceptic groups from the reference level. If 
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the theory of a grand coalition between PES and PPE holds, there should be a positive 
correlation between membership of a large party group and the number of reports acquired.  
In the case of a Parliament still mainly occupied by its institutional position, 
eurosceptic groups should acquire fewer reports than medium sized caucuses. Last, the 
partisan perspective requires parliamentarian groups to “organize the legislature in a way 
that place its members in strategically advantageous positions”. (Krehbiel, 1993: 235) 
Independent members should therefore acquire fewer reports than medium sized groups 
(Hc2). If the correlation between independent MEPs and report allocation on the other hand 
proves to be negative, the partisan perspective must be rejected. 
5.2.3 Distinguishing Workers from Free-Riders 
As the preliminary study of reelection and career paths has already revealed, any study of 
the EP will have to distinguish who have decided to opt out of the competition for reports. 
Three indicators have been chosen to do the separation. Two of them are chosen for their 
empirical aptitude to capture the inclination to engage in legislative work. The third is more 
theoretically founded, and measures how MEPs without ambitions for a European career are 
less prone to take on extra work. 
 Other MEPs are, conversely, obliged to take on the chores no one else are willing to 
do. 
 
Participation During Voting Sessions 
The European Parliament has been plagued with a high degree of absenteeism. Votes are 
personal in the EP; there is no possibility of delegating this task to fellow parliamentarians. 
Common voting sessions are furthermore organized separately from debates. (Corbett, 
2007: 174) Participation during voting is therefore relatively swift insofar as the debates are 
already closed. Considering voting to be a cost-effective investment in legislative work 
compared to the drawing of reports, it is hardly likely MEPs who find voting sessions 
tiresome should take on reports.    
The variable “Participation” expresses participation rates during the same roll-call 
votes as the ideological NOMINATE scores are deduced from. The higher the score, the more 
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often the MEP has partaken in voting. The correlation between participation during roll-calls 
and further investment in legislative work should by way of consequence be highly positive. 
The control variable already presented which expresses the years in office also give 
an indication of the short-term intentions of MEPs. The longer an MEP stays in office, the 
more should he be interested in gaining influence.  
 
A Country Club for the Elders? 
Remembering Corbett’s claim that the EP sometimes work as a comfortable retirement 
home for national politicians (1998: 67), there might be a negative relationship between age 
and legislative activity. This does not imply, however, that younger MEPs necessarily pursue 
a European career. Whereas seniority in the committees of Parliament should be an 
advantage, age is not.   
The variable “Aged 60+” expresses whether an MEP is 60 years or older (as of June the 
year of the election of the legislature). If the assembly is populated by retirees, there should 
be a negative correlation between the group of 60+ and the number of reports written.  
 
Getting the Work Done – Committee Chairmen as the Default Rapporteur 
The committee chair writes reports which are not wanted by any of the caucuses. 
Committee chairmen are representatives for the chamber as a whole, and can therefore be 
counted as reliable negotiators.  The office as committee chair should as a result be 
positively related to acquisition of reports.  
The variable “Committee Chair” uses simple rank-and-file members as a base-line. Any 
MEP who was a chairman or a vice-chairman some time during the legislature is coded as 
such.   
The operationalizations done do not capture all the substantial characteristics of non-
rapporteurs. They should be sufficient, however, to filter out noise masking true 
organizational trends.  
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6 The Statistical Model – Criteria for 
Influence  
Once the indicators of a unified model are labeled, two models of report allocation will be 
fitted. The main model considers all reports to be of equal value, its response variable being 
the number of reports acquired during the legislature. (6.1.) A second model will then be 
fitted among only rapporteurs. Is the hierarchy continued for distribution of the most salient 
reports? (6.2.) 
6.1 Number of Reports 
Some of the variables defined above overlap, and may obscure true tendencies. Two fits 
with alternative indicators will therefore be done. A first model includes MEPs’ distance 
from the floor and a dummy marking new member states as separate indicators, but 
contrary to the second fit it keeps large party groups (PES and PPE) in its reference level with 
medium sized groups. Similarly, this first fit only includes the number of consecutive periods 
in the EP, not their committee incumbency.  
The final descriptive model includes committee incumbency as well as the type of 
party group MEPs belong to using only medium sized caucuses as a reference level, thereby 
testing for the presence of a grand coalition. 
6.1.1 Presence of an Informational Two Level Game 
From what is seen in these two models rapporteurs have some of the expertise typical for a 
professional political class. Majority rules and party group discipline ensure furthermore that 
this expertise is put to use for collective benefits, rather than the individual preferences of a 
few policy-outliers.   
 
The EP Forms its own Elite – Hypothesisb2 
If the EP has the self confidence of a traditional legislature, it should trust its capacity to 
form and select its own elite of prime legislators. This should be reflected in the selection of 
rapporteurs with previous experience in the EP.   
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 The group of long serving MEPs, however, does not seem to be more active than 
freshmen unless they also served on the same committee during the last legislature. The 
first fit of the model suggests an increasingly parabolic shaped correlation between the 
number of reelections to Parliament and report allocations, with a top point at the 2nd or 3rd 
term in office. However, when committee incumbency is controlled for, the impact of 
several terms in Parliament becomes insignificant. It is not the case that the longer you stay 
in the EP, the more reports you acquire.   
 Previous studies have been divided as to the importance of incumbency in the 
organization of legislative work: From their studies of reelection rates and committee 
incumbency both the studies of Bowler and Farrell (1995: 240) and Hausemer (2006: 522, 
524) express their doubts of a European equivalent to the seniority rule in the US Congress.  
In their studies of committee assignments in the 5th parliament and report allocation 
in the 6th parliament, MacElroy and Yordanova choose committee incumbency, rather than 
reelection to Parliament, as an indicator of specialization. In line with the present results 
both find a strong, significant and positive tendency (MacElroy, 2006: 16-17; Yordanova, 
2009: 271). MacElroy also controls committee incumbency against years served in 
parliament and finds the years previously served in the EP to be negatively correlated to 
committee assignments. Committees have a quite distinguishable preference for specialized 
MEPs to simple EP veterans.  
Keeping in mind the second order nature of European elections, results indicate how 
some MEPs stay in Parliament although they have no ambitions. Using reelection rates to 
indicate a core of long-term legislators is a blunt tool to assess the careerist ambitions of 
MEPs.  
All in all; the most recent studies have revealed the importance of specialized experience in 
the EP. The present findings confirm this trend, and extend its conclusions to the allocation 
of reports. There are signs of an elite formed within the institution, and not simply imported 
elsewhere from for a short period of time.  
Results from the regressions corroborate the informational hypothesisb2 that key-
legislators tend to specialize in given policy domains in order to gain more influence. This is 
not to say, however, that the chamber allows for self-selection of policy-outliers (Ha1).  
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What Determines the Number of Reports MEPs Write? 
Negative Binomial Model with Loglink 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -2,513 *** -1,770 ** -2,586 *** -1,910 ** -4,133 *** -2,634 *** 
Specialization:                         
1 Period in EP     0,109   0,114   0,140 † 0,173 † 0,390 ** 
2 Periods in EP     
  
0,123   0,175   0,297 ** 0,214   
3 Periods in EP             0,154   0,160   0,739 ** 
4 Periods in EP     
  
    
 
  -0,191   0,369   
5 Periods in EP                     -0,713   
New Member State -0,975 * 0,145 
 
    -30,358   
 
  -0,502 ** 
System Critics:                         
Distance from Floor -0,736 ** -0,451 * 0,221   -0,037   -0,137   -1,818 * 
Eurosceptic 0,834 *** -0,465 * -0,169   0,376 ** -0,517 ** -0,652 * 
Partisan Expectations:                         
Non-affiliated  0,134   0,107   -0,241   -0,811 *** -0,706 *** -1,141 *** 
Distance from Group 0,428   -0,273 
 
-1,176 † 0,337   -0,644   -2,605   
Group Leader -0,378 *** -0,303 * -0,164   -0,176 † -0,158   -0,681 * 
European Specificities:                         
Aged 60+ -0,243 † -0,190   -0,399 *** -0,288 ** -0,346 ** -0,076   
Committee Chair 0,637 *** 0,913 *** 0,881 *** 0,511 *** 1,375 *** 2,333 *** 
Committee Vice-Chair 0,218   0,477 *** 0,186   0,249 * 0,295 *** 1,093 *** 
Activity:                         
Participation 2,398 *** 2,153 *** 2,093 *** 1,497 *** 2,062 *** 1,318 ** 
1-2 Years in Term 1,762 *** 0,718 
 
1,936 ** 0,523   3,216 ** 0,393   
2-3 Years in Term 2,840 *** 1,592 ** 2,301 *** 1,435 * 3,797 *** 0,995 † 
3-4 Years in Term 2,248 *** 1,636 ** 2,480 *** 1,853 ** 3,777 *** 1,316 * 
4-5 Years in Term 2,688 *** 1,914 *** 2,936 *** 2,134 *** 3,777 *** 1,905 *** 
N. Observations 531   628   593   692   695   929   
2x log-likelihood -1880   -2251   -2560   -2379   -2776   -2194   
 
 Figure 6.1: First Fit – What Determines the Number of Reports MEPs Write? 
The first fit includes a dummy expressing the presence of a new member state and a 
measure of ideological preferences. 
 The dependent variable is the number of legislative drafts obtained by MEPs during 
their stay in Parliament. 
Significance level: † 90%; * 95%; ** 99%; *** 99,9%. 
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What Determines the Number of Reports MEPs Write? 
Negative Binomial Model with Loglink 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -2,577 *** -1,626 ** -2,267 *** -2,450 *** -4,222 *** -3,089 *** 
Specialization:                         
Periods in EP     -0,701   0,066   0,077   -0,052   -0,035   
Incumbent Committee     0,786 
 
0,106   0,224 † 0,299 ** 0,585 *** 
System Critics:                         
Eurosceptic 0,834 *** -0,465 * -0,169   0,376 ** -0,517 ** -0,652 * 
Partisan Expectations:                         
Non-affiliated  -0,270   -0,297 
 
-0,424 † -0,920 *** -1,306 *** -1,042 ** 
Distance from Group -1,405 † -0,919 † -1,549 * -0,312   -0,621   -3,911 * 
Group Leader -0,605 *** -0,329 * -0,266 * -0,239 * -0,178   -0,650 * 
European Specificities:                         
Grand Coalition -0,193 † -0,414 *** -0,384 ** -0,097 
 
-0,030   0,159   
Aged 60+ -0,195 † -0,259 * -0,401 *** -0,354 ** -0,304 ** -0,065   
Committee Chair 0,682 *** 0,996 *** 0,864 *** 0,525 *** 1,398 *** 2,284 *** 
Committee Vice-Chair 0,078   0,462 *** 0,176   0,230 * 0,301 ** 1,107 *** 
Activity:                         
Participation 2,183 *** 2,275 *** 2,376 *** 1,523 *** 2,186 *** 0,989 * 
1-2 Years in Term 1,840 *** 0,796 
 
1,922 ** 0,054 
 
3,248 ** 0,526   
2-3 Years in Term 2,641 *** 1,599 ** 2,216 *** 1,614 ** 3,774 *** 1,077 † 
3-4 Years in Term 2,397 *** 1,668 ** 2,426 *** 1,426 * 3,756 *** 1,648 ** 
4-5 Years in Term 2,858 *** 1,880 *** 2,855 *** 2,613 *** 3,694 *** 2,142 *** 
N. Observations 532   628   593   692   696   929   
2x log-likelihood -1902   -2240   -2550   -2540   -2792   -2207   
  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Final Fit – What Determines the Number of Reports MEPs Write? 
The second model includes a variable expressing the type of caucus to which MEPs belong. 
The reference level is set to rank-and-file members of medium sized groups who are 
freshmen. 
 The dependent variable is the number of legislative drafts obtained by MEPs during 
their stay in Parliament. 
Significance level: † 90%; * 95%; ** 99%; *** 99,9% 
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Rapporteurs are Selected by the Floor – Hypothesisa1-b1 
Implications derived from the majoritarian postulate are tested by three further indicators: 
As key-legislators are selected by the floor, the likelihood of obtaining legislative drafts 
decreases as the MEP moves away from the median voter of the assembly. The consensual 
distribution of reports excludes furthermore both grand coalitions and system-critics.  
  
Rapporteurs are Representative of the Floor Preferences 
NOMINATE estimations are done from data on votes without consideration of party group 
identities. Hix, Noury and Roland are nonetheless surprised by the coherence among 
political groups. To avoid interference from group measures, the first model keeps all 
caucuses in its reference level with the exception of non-affiliated members and 
eurosceptics.  
Figure 6.1 shows how the likelihood of obtaining reports decreases as an MEP’s 
preferences become more extreme. The tendency holds in five out of six parliamentary 
periods, attaining statistical significance thrice. The correlation is particularly strong during 
the last legislature, though it is impossible to tell whether this is the beginning of a more 
pronounced trend or simply circumstantial. 
Previous studies of the EP have indicated that even though committee key legislators 
are not general preference outliers, they may have deviating preferences in the domains in 
which they choose to specialize (Keading, 2004). Gail McElroy’s study of PPE and PES 
committee assignments finds nonetheless committees to be representative of the floor both 
in their general voting patterns as well as on issues falling under MEPs specific committee 
jurisdiction (McElroy, 2006: 18-25). 
Present results show that rapporteurs are not general preference outliers on the 
main policy dimension. The distributive hypothesisa1 is rejected, indicating that the floor 
majority has kept control over the rapporteur selection. MEP’s position in questions 
opposing the left to the right is relevant to his or her influence in Parliament.  
 
A Consensual Distribution does not Allow for a Grand Coalition 
The model shown in figure 6.2 bluntly rejects the expectation of a day-to-day grand coalition 
between the socialists and conservatives. The correlation is in fact constantly negative up to 
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the 2004 elections, with the three first periods attaining statistical significance. Mamadouh 
and Raunio’s claim that there was such an alliance during the 3rd and the 4th periods finds no 
support in the present study (2003: 246); quite to the contrary.  
As neither the center-left nor the centre-right have ever held more than 50% of the EP 
seats, there is little hope for the extremely disproportional results some American authors 
expect from the majority. Yet, subsequent studies of coalitions is central to conclude to what 
extent the EP does function as an ordinary political assembly. 
 The rejection of a grand coalition does however support Benedetto’s (2005) claim 
that the allotment of reports is consensual, set out to accommodate the entire legislature, 
and not only the majority. Results from the first half of the periods even imply that large 
caucuses yield influence to smaller groups in order to accommodate their needs. The 
evolution from the 4th parliament to the present suggests a progress towards less 
cooperative organization, paralleling Hix et al.’s suggestion of an increased competition for 
reports on the left-right axis.  
 
System Critics are Less Active, Yet not Banned 
The majority principle also entails a certain notion of common preferences on an 
institutional level. In an established parliamentary system, however, the general debate is 
centered on policy rather than institutional questions. System-critical parliamentarians tend 
to be fewer and are confronted with the option of loosing influence or participate in an 
organization they do not recognize, and thereby reinforcing its position.  
 Figure 6.2 reveals eurosceptic groups are under-represented among rapporteurs in 
four parliaments – and significantly so in two cases. In the 1st and 4th legislatures, on the 
other hand, euroscepticism is in fact positively and significantly correlated with the 
acquisition of reports.  
As the general debate moves away from the institutional setting, eurosceptic 
participation within the EP should heighten – given that these groups wish to participate. 
There is no sign of such an evolution in table 6.2.  
The second voting dimension which is associated with the degree of euroenthusiasm 
is cross-cutting the first axis. This implies that there is not necessarily a correlation between 
an MEP’s preference on one dimension and his voting patterns on another dimension. Does 
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this mean that the EP strategically selects their rapporteurs in view of the policy dimension 
in question? Subsequent studies should test whether eurosceptics receive reports related to 
integrationist subjects as well, or if eurosceptics have chosen to eschew legislative work all 
together.  
Generally speaking, eurosceptics are however less active than other groups during 
legislation. Just as institutional questions constitute the second most important dimension in 
Parliament, there is still a fraction of system critics within the EP who have not been 
integrated into the legislative process; either because its members have chosen to opt out or 
because their pairs do not trust them with the responsibility.  
Caucuses Organize Expertise for their Common Good - Hypothesisc1  
Party Groups Prefer Loyal Members 
Because information may be used strategically, European parliamentarian groups should 
choose representatives who are loyal to the party political view.  
 Figure 6.2 indicates unruly group members obtain fewer reports than their more 
docile colleagues. The correlation between voting patterns and acquisition of reports is 
negative in all six periods and significantly so in five out of six legislatures. The results are in 
line with the partisan hypothesis that party leaders choose representatives who are likely to 
work on behalf of the caucus. In the particular case of the European Parliament, this 
certainly gives an indicator as to how well transnational political groups are able to filter out 
unmanageable members. The result stands in stark contrast to Mamadouh and Raunio’s 
claim that European caucuses lack of disciplinary tools (2003: 341).  
The propensity of group leaders to select loyal representatives might be more 
general than simply during report allocation: In her analysis of committee allotments 
McElroy also finds indications that “party representatives on a committee are not 
ideologically different from their co-partisans” (2006: 18). Hausemer also finds similar results 
in his study of report salience (2006: 523).  
The strong results revealed in figure 6.2 corroborate the partisan hypothesisc1, 
indicating the presence of a two-level informational game between transnational party 
groups and the chamber. Both are able to discard policy-outliers from the competition for 
reports. 
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Division of Labor Between Group Leaders and Rapporteurs 
According to Cox and McCubbins party group members share a common reputation, and if 
transnational caucuses have developed a sense of mutual trust, legislative work should be 
done by division of labor. Group leaders should not profit from their position of power to 
obtain more tasks than they can handle, but rather delegate responsibilities to the most 
competent group members. 
 As observed in figure 6.2, the correlation between group leadership and report 
allocation is negative in all periods under consideration, and significantly so in five out of six 
cases. During the 30 years following the first direct elections to the EP, group chairmen and 
vice-chairmen wrote fewer reports than simple rank-and-file group members. The results do 
indeed corroborate the partisan expectations of an effectively organized system of caucuses 
equipped with disciplinary tools within the EP.  
This conclusion stands in contrast with the ones drawn by Yordanova in her 2009 
study of committee assignments: “Partisan loyalty and seniority do not increase the 
likelihood of assignment to powerful committee (…). Combined with the lack of 
overrepresentation of big party groups of national party delegations on powerful 
committees, it is hard to find any evidence for the partisan rationale. (Yordanova, 2009: 269, 
274). The diverging conclusions are the result of different understandings of partisan 
expectations and hence its operationalizations. On one hand, Yordanova considers national 
party delegations and transnational party groups to be measures of the same phenomenon 
(i.e. political parties in general). It is hardly a good test to use national delegations to verify 
whether the European legislative organization follows the partisan rationale. On the other 
hand she expects large parties (whether national or European) to reap disproportional 
benefits irrespective of their relative size in Parliament. This is highly improbable – especially 
in a system of open rules.  
 
Integration is Mainly done Through Transnational Groups  
In his analysis of report allocation during the second half of the 4th legislature, Benedetto 
wanders if the deficient experience of the Finns and the Swedes who had only just become 
EU members may explain their lack of codecision reports. (2005: 82-84) His question is 
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relevant: Are members of national delegations from new member states less privileged than 
freshmen from other member states?   
In the case of the 1995 enlargement, Benedetto might have been right. Whereas the 
bivariate study of report allocation indicated that all but one of the 18 states which have 
joined the EC since 1979 were under-represented among rapporteurs during their first term, 
this is not the case when controlling for lack of experience and the time spent in the EP. 
Nationality remains significant and negative in the 1st and the 6th period, while the remaining 
two periods lack completely of both tendency and significance. Only Greece joined the EC 
during the 1st period, and as already observed from figure 3.5, the Greek nation has not 
distinguished itself as ardent rapporteurs at any time during the last 28 years since its 
accession. As the number of terms previously served in the EP is calculated from the 1979 
election in which the number of MEPs more than doubled, the 1st period does not contain 
any controls for the many freshmen. The 1st legislature is in this sense quite exceptional.  
On the other hand, it is hardly surprising that the accession of 12 new members to 
the EU during the 6th period should have some impact. The massive arrival of new MEPs in 
the 6th parliament must have heightened the pressure on incumbent group members. Figure 
6.2 expresses an increased importance of committee experience and high rates of reports 
distributed by default (i.e. by committee chairs and vice-chairs). New nationalities are an 
appropriate test for the capacity of caucuses to absorb and integrate new members. From 
the 5th to the 6th period rapporteur characteristics became more pronounced, despite the 
high correlation between new nationalities and report allocation.  
Yet, the diminished impact of new member states across all periods illustrates the 
integrationist role of transnational party groups. Only when the number of new arrivals 
becomes too important does nationality reappear. There is no doubt as to the differences 
existing among nationalities in their inclination to invest in legislative work. Yet, national 
determinants are less obvious than what previous literature has indicated (e.g. Mamadouh 
and Raunio, 2003).  
Non-Affiliated Members are Second Class Rapporteurs – Hypothesisc2 
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The choice to submit to party group discipline would be hard to explain if the adherence to a 
group did not bring more advantages than what an individual MP could expect if he were on 
his own. 
 Some MEPs do however choose to stay independent of any caucus. This fraction 
writes fewer reports than their group affiliated comrades. The tendency was already 
observed in the bivariate analysis, and it holds throughout the multivarible analysis. As figure 
6.2 indicates there is a general and negative correlation between group independence and 
reports written, attaining statistical significance during the last four periods. The trend has 
increased in force for the last 15 years; much in line with Hix et al.’s claim that the impact of 
institutional questions has dropped since the beginning of the 1990’s. As the need for 
qualified majorities decreases, party politics along ideological lines may resume. 
 Technical groups were created in order to mend the disadvantage of independent 
members, as most of Parliament’s work is organized by caucuses.  Yet, the inclusion of such 
groups in the measure of non-affiliated members does not prevent a negative correlation. 
This further illustrates the informational role of transnational political groups and 
substantiates the central role of caucuses.  
6.1.2 European Specificities  
Quite a number of MEPs stay in Parliament without showing interest in its legislation. The 
amplitude of the indicators on activity illustrates how important the phenomenon is. 
Unattractive tasks have therefore to be assumed by other MEPs. 
 
Participation  
The participation indicator captures well the stark differences between those who 
contribute to EU legislation and European free-riders. The positive and constantly significant 
correlation between participation in roll-calls and preparing bills is indeed impressing. 
Adding this variable during model fitting caused the plots of predicted values against 
observed values to go from badly fitted bell-shaped barplots to well-behaved diagrams, thus 
emphasizing the predictive value of activity rates.  
 As the factorization of the “Years in Term” variable in both figure 6.1 and 6.2 
indicates, there is indeed a linear and positive correlation between reports written and 
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length of tenure. This is hardly surprising, yet it is important to remember that most MEPs sit 
through their entire mandate. This control further articulates the difference among short-
termers and those with medium-term incentives to engage in legislative chores. 
 The measure of legislative activity reveals the chasm between those among the MEPs 
who do not seek influence to build a European career, and those who do. The remaining 
group of parliamentarians fits rather well into the hypotheses derived from classic theories 
on legislative organization. 
 
The Green Fields of Grassing Party Horses – On Its Way Out? 
MEPs older than 60 years write fewer reports than their younger counterparts. This 
tendency has been surprisingly constant throughout the years and is statistically significant 
in all but the last legislature. 
 The result is quite in contrast with previous studies of committee assignments: 
Neither Bowler and Farrell (1995: 232, 238) nor McElroy (2006: 16) find a correlation 
between age and committee seats. Both analyses express the age in years, expecting a linear 
relationship. Yordanova, on the other hand, has chosen a more sophisticated measure, but 
finds no significant correlation between MEPs aged in the top quartile and committee seats. 
Her findings are quite in line with the present results for the 6th legislature. 
The results in figure 6.2 give, contrary to previous research, credit to Burgess’ allegation 
that to some the EP is a final station for fading political careers. The question is whether the 
disappearance of the trend in the 6th Parliament marks the end of a tradition?  
 
Increasing Competition?  
The default rapporteur is the committee chairman. He or she has to assume the 
responsibility for the preparation of any proposition unwanted by the party groups. 
Hausemer has already found that both committee chairs and vice-chairs receive reports 
whish are less salient to them than to their parliamentarian colleagues (2006: 523).  
 Looking at figure 6.2, it is evident that this solution has been used throughout the 
whole period. The position of committee chair is strongly, positively and significantly 
correlated with the acquisition of reports during all six periods. Vice-chairs also obtain more 
reports than their due, and their over-representation is statistically significant from 1984 and 
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on. Both tendencies reach a peak during the last legislature; probably due to the massive 
arrival of inexperienced MEPs.  
 
From the general distribution of reports it is apparent that a number of MEPs do not 
compete for reports; their behavior is not predictable by theory. On the other hand, MEPs 
with legislative ambitions show patterns recognizable by traditional theories: They tend to 
specialize, and their activities are monitored by both the majority in the chamber and 
transnational caucuses. 
As new powers have been admitted to the European Parliament through the 
introduction of new legislative procedures, the difference in salience between reports has 
become more pronounced. Does the competition increase when stakes are high?  
6.2 Salient Reports – Pushing the Selection Further 
Parliament’s weight varies across policy areas, although the exact impact of procedures has 
been subject for debate. The following study considers individual MEPs to maximize 
influence through the most influent procedures. In order for a competitive allocation to take 
place, it is necessary that MEPs perceive certain procedures to be more salient, and are thus 
willing to strive to obtain them. The best way to account for this may be the experience of 
Richard Corbett, himself a long-term MEP.  
6.2.1 The Increased Necessity of an Agile Rapporteur 
The extension of Parliament’s role by new procedures has implied a significant increase in 
the possible stages of legislative work. By 2004 co-decision was considered to be the default 
procedure covering more than half of the European legislation, each draft implying 3 
possible readings. This has called for a rationalization in Parliament’s legislative work: 
 
“The sheer volume of co-decision procedures after Amsterdam means that both 
institutions have an important interest in not allowing all disagreements to spill over 
into the conciliation process. This realization has led to much more intensive contact 
between the institutions earlier in the procedure.” (Corbett, 2007: 216) 
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The economy of an early agreement was also the primary goal when the Amsterdam treaty 
made it possible to reach an agreement already after the first reading. In the 5th parliament 
only 22% of all drafts went to conciliation. The first half of the 6th parliament showed the 
trend to be increasing; only 6% of all dossiers were concluded in conciliation (Corbett, 2007: 
216). 
 Conciliation casts, in the words of Corbett, “a backward shadow over the whole 
legislative procedure”. This was also the reason why the first version of the co-decision 
procedure was criticized. As Parliament’s possibility to overturn Council propositions 
improves, the latter should become more cooperative. To Corbett this process started early: 
“Even in the early years of co-decision, some highly sensitive issues did not reach conciliation 
but the Parliament was still able to have an impact” (2007: 227). From these accounts, the 
improved authority of a parliamentarian veto should reflect upon the rapporteur who leads 
negotiations. Some legislative drafts should thereby be more salient than others. The 
present study has extended this logic to the evaluation of all procedures. 
Contact between institutions has become frequent and more informal. The 
rapporteur frequently becomes a spokesman for Parliament even before the formalities for 
conciliation are met. “Trialogues are taking place at all stages of the procedure, and often 
even before the Parliament’s rapporteur or the Council Presidency have any formal 
mandate” (Corbett, 2007: 228).  
Parliament has in time won self-confidence and left its oppositional role to become 
more cooperative. In Corbett’s experience, when conciliation becomes unavoidable, both 
parties are ready to make concessions, but to a prize which is not set before negotiations 
start (2007: 229). In order to issue threats and gain leverage with Council, the rapporteur 
needs extensive knowledge of his support in Parliament. What are his possibilities of 
obtaining the required majorities in case of conflict?  
This support has furthermore to be known to the Council so that both his threats and 
his promises are credible. Any lack of confidence may result in a higher price paid by 
Parliament, or worse, no agreement at all. Corbett quotes several examples where 
Parliament has succeeded in winning over the sufficient number of Council delegates by 
allowing for side-deals on less central demands (2007: 229). This is only possible for a 
73 
 
parliamentarian delegation with detailed knowledge of the specific policy area in question, 
as well as known to have the confidence of the floor. 
When the rapporteur returns to the plenary with the outlines of an accord, he will 
need the confidence of the assembly that he has obtained the best possible deal. Starting a 
trialogue without any formal mandate requires a fortiori a commendable reputation as a 
choice policy expert. 
MEPs should thus obtain salient reports only after a harsh selection. A hierarchy 
among rapporteurs should form in which the criteria distinguished in the previous analysis 
are further sharpened. Rapporteurs of salient reports should be more experienced than their 
counterparts. Because of the high stakes, Parliament would rather confide sensitive dossiers 
to well-known political craftsmen than to new-comers. This should imply a continuous use of 
committee chairmen in cases where no other reliable option is at hand. They should be 
representative of the floor preferences, as well as their own caucus.  
In short, rapporteurs to salient procedures should be careerist European politicians 
who are well-known by their pairs and are more active than most during legislative 
preparations. 
6.2.2 Hierarchy Among Rapporteurs 
The statistical analysis in figure 6.3 is done among MEPs who have obtained at least one 
report during their mandate. Some of the criteria distinguished during the selection of 
rapporteurs are further sharpened in the choices for the more influential procedures. 
Because of the lower number of observations, some of the control variables have been 
removed. Their colinearity would have masked true tendencies. 
Different Informational Priorities 
The selection still follows the informational repertoire of specialization and 
representativeness. When the more influent rapporteurs are picked out, their degree of 
specialization is higher than for other drafts. Their degree of loyalty remains, however, much 
the same as for all key-legislators. 
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What Determines the Number of Salient Reports MEPs Write? 
Negative Binomial Model with Loglink 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -0,109   -0,469 † -0,219   -0,781 * -1,413 *** -0,185   
Specialization:                         
Incumbent Committee -   0,020   0,475 * 0,563 *** 0,269 † 0,536 *** 
Representativeness                         
Distance from Floor -0,389   -0,152   -0,321   0,809 † 0,310   -1,379 † 
Partisan Expectations:                         
Distance from Group 0,828   -1,740   -4,767 † 1,082   -0,598   0,175   
Group Leader 0,160   -0,408   -0,535 † -0,169   -0,008   -0,604 † 
Activity:                         
Committee Chair 0,443 † 0,720 * 1,205 *** -0,336   1,287 *** 1,210 *** 
Committee Vice-Chair 0,211   0,159   0,016   -0,026   0,378 † 0,098   
Participation 1,658 *** 1,788 *** 1,304 ** 0,440   1,674 *** 0,372   
N. Observations 336   395   424   471   514   371   
 
 
Higher Degree of Specialization for Salient Reports – Hypothesisb2 
Specialization as measured by committee incumbency is positively correlated to acquisitions 
of salient reports in all legislatures, and significantly so from the 3rd period on. This is much 
similar to the trends found in the general selection of key-legislators (during which 
committee incumbency becomes significant from the 4th period), and may simply 
correspond to the progressive formation of an EP political class after 1979.  
Yet, the neat tendencies also match the introduction of the co-decision procedure. Those 
responsible for the more consequential reports have on average stayed longer on the 
Figure 6.3: What Determines the Number of Salient Reports MEPs Write? 
The model includes all MEPs who have obtained at least one legislative draft during their 
term. The response variable expresses the number of salient reports accumulated by 
rapporteurs. The table shows how some rapporteur characteristics become more 
pronounced as the stakes increase.  
 Committee incumbency indicates in this table MEPs who wrote at least one report 
in the same committee during last legislature. 
 Significance level: † 90%; * 95%; ** 99%; *** 99,9% 
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committee in question than most rapporteurs. They have thereby acquired more knowledge 
both of the policy domain and its recent history in the EP than what is generally the case 
even among rapporteurs. Because of the detailed negotiations in which the rapporteur risks 
to find himself, policy expertise is all the more important than what is needed in less salient 
procedures. Committee incumbent rapporteurs have experience both from drawing 
previous reports and from the policy area in question. He might have acquired some policy 
network from previous activities, and he is possibly known to the Council representatives. 
The informational hypothesisb2 is in fact expressed by an ever stricter requirement of 
expertise as Parliament gains in power. This, it seems, is true both over time and across 
policy domains. 
 
Not More Representative than Most Rapporteurs – Hypothesesa1-b1 
The trends found in the voting records of elite rapporteurs are more blurry, however. The 
ideological distance from the floor median comes out with a negative correlation in four out 
of six cases. Yet, it obtains statistical significance only once during the very last period. 
Conversely, distance from floor preferences was actually positively correlated with 
acquisition of reports during the 4th and the 5th period, and significantly so once.  
In the analysis of report allocation among all MEPs correlations were positive during the 
3rd and the 4th legislatures. The trends do, however, remain similar both in the hierarchy 
between rapporteurs and non-rapporteurs, as well as the hierarchy among rapporteurs 
themselves. Combining the result from the two regressions points towards at least 
somewhat stricter selection in policy areas where the EP has increased influence.  
It is hard to distinguish a similar pattern across time, however. The correlation between 
floor distance and report allocation is high and negative in both analyses of the 6th period, 
yet not necessarily in the 3rd, 4th and 5th. Is this the beginning of a trend or simply a result of 
the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements? 
 
Consistent Partisan Selection – Hypothesisc1 
Party group voting discipline among those who are trusted with salient procedures is not 
consistently better than what is average among rapporteurs. During the 1st, 4th and the 6th 
period influential reports were trusted to MEPs with no better voting records than ordinary 
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rapporteurs. Caucuses in the 2nd, 3rd and 5th legislatures showed on the other hand 
preference for the more loyal group members. The consistently high and significant 
correlations during the previous analyses in figure 6.1 and 6.2 indicate, however, that party 
group selection is done in a strict fashion for all rapporteurs, whatever their influence. The 
selection is simply not consistently harsher yet for salient reports. 
Yordanova finds much the same trend in the selection to six out of eleven influential 
committees during the 6th parliament. Her results fail to attain statistical significance, 
however. This leads her to conclude that “party group loyalty in voting does not explain 
assignment to the powerful EP committees.” (2009: 271, 274) Results from the present study 
might elucidate these findings by illustrating how party group selection is done on an early 
stage.  
The more influent procedures require possibly more time than single readings, and 
should be distributed to MEPs who do not have other time-consuming responsibilities in the 
EP. From the second period and on, the position “group chair or vice-chair” is negatively 
correlated with the acquisition of salient reports. Those among transnational party group 
leaders who take on reports tend to obtain less salient drafts than their rank-and-file 
comrades. This is quite in line with a division of labor among group members in which 
individuals should devote their time on specialized tasks.  
Insistence on Experience and Participation 
Committee Chair Preferred to Committee Vice-Chairs. 
As revealed from figure 6.3 committee chairmen continue to take on influent legislative 
work. The correlation is continuously positive and statistically significant, with the exception 
of the 4th parliament. This parallels the high rate of dossiers accumulated in the general 
distribution of reports. A disproportional number of these are in fact drafts falling under 
salient procedures.  
The role of the committee vice-chairs seem to be somewhat different. Whereas the 
coefficients for vice-chairmen remain positive in all but the 4th period, none reaches 
statistical significance. Cross-examination of the two tables 6.2 and 6.3 suggests a division of 
labor between the committee chair and his vice-chairmen. Committee vice-chairs do take on 
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more reports than their share, but few of these reports are considered salient. The more 
influent drafts are in fact assumed by the chair himself.  
Parliament prefers the more experienced politicians for the more challenging tasks.  
 
Time-consuming Tasks for the Most Active Legislators 
Participation rates during roll-calls are higher still among rapporteurs for the salient 
legislation. Figure 6.3 contains solely positive correlations between participation and the 
acquisition of attractive reports, with four periods attaining statistical significance. Salient 
dossiers also imply a possible increase in the work-load compared to legislative drafts 
subject to fewer readings.  
Clearly, there is a large and continuous difference in the activity rates of MEPs: Most 
rapporteurs engage in more legislative work (other than drawing reports) than the average 
in the chamber. Yet, among rapporteurs there are also differences. The high coefficients of 
participation in figure 6.3 emphasize what was already observed during the analysis of all 
MEPs: The inclination to engage in legislative work in Parliament is extremely fluctuant. Only 
the most active among the MEPs obtain salient legislative drafts.     
 
From the analysis of salient reports we can detect a continuous hierarchy among legislators. 
Representativeness both of the floor and of the political group is ensured among all MEPs 
who are trusted with a legislative draft, and only marginally better among the more influent 
parliamentarians. Demands for specialization and experience, on the other hand, increase 
with the impact of the draft legislation. When no other rapporteur is available, the 
committee chair- or vice-chairman is called upon, yet for the more important drafts, the 
senior representative is preferred.  
In short, competition increases as Parliament gains in impact, both over time and 
across policy domains. 
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7 Does the Model Fit?  
How well does the model fit the actual data? Significance levels especially in the first study 
of report allocations are quite impressive, much due to the exceptional extent of the data. 
Do the trends reflect any substantial organization of the EP, or are they simply secondary 
effects rendered visible by the right choice of statistical techniques and high quanta?   
 There are many ways to test the choice of models. The study has opted for three 
straightforward methods: The ultimate test of any fit should be the extent to which the 
model is able to predict a similar outcome as what is in fact observed (6.1). To what extent 
have the data been forced into the model by the manipulation of missing and unusual data 
(6.2)? Third, do any alternative statistical models yield substantially different results (6.3)?   
7.1 Valid Predictions – Fitted Values vs. True Values 
The intent of the present study has not been to predict the precise outcome of report 
distribution by adding up an unlimited number of indicators. The objective has rather been 
to reveal some of the organizational aspects of the European Parliament by a careful 
selection of indicators. The predicted outcomes of the model remain nonetheless an 
important means to assess whether major predictive aspects have been left out. This is all 
the more relevant as the study is done not on a selection of observations, but on all data. 
The true values of the response variable are in fact known and can be compared to the 
predictions of the model. 
7.1.1 The Competition for Reports – Changing Importance of the 
Dependent Variables  
Figure 7.1 expresses the predicted frequencies of reports written in all six legislative periods 
in the final fit of the negative binomial model from table 6.2. The bar plot is superposed by 
dots signifying the observed values of report allocation. As the bars convey rather intuitively, 
the model reproduces the distribution of reports pretty well. Both curves have generally 
speaking about the same form.  
As was commented upon in the introduction to this study, the true distribution of 
reports is extremely long tailed. Some MEPs acquire a highly disproportional number of 
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reports. This is only to some extent captured by the model. Yet, the predictions of the 2nd, 
3rd, 5th and 6th parliament include outcomes up to 15-20 reports by MEP. European 
legislative work is partially done by a few super-rapporteurs taking on an almost endless 
number of drafts. 
Frequencies of the central values tend to be fitted higher than what is warranted for. 
This is especially the case for the 4th parliament, whereas the two first and the last 
legislatures are quite well behaved. 
On the other hand, the report distribution being highly skewed, the model under-
estimates the high number of non-rapporteurs during all six periods. Until the indicators of 
legislative activity were integrated into the fit, the plot of predicted values tended towards a 
Gaussian distribution. In particular the coefficient of participation during roll-calls changed 
the curve of predicted values quite radically for the first four parliaments. The frequency of 
zero reports was up to this point extremely low, whereas one, two or three report 
acquisitions were predicted to be quite recurrent. Only the plot of the 6th parliament looked 
much like it does presently. This emphasizes the importance of a preliminary distinction 
between those MEPs who actually participate in the quest for legislative tasks, and those 
who do not. The notable fits of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd parliamentary periods are mainly effects 
of the measures of activity.  
The trends which cause the fit in the 6th legislature are somewhat different, however. 
They preexisted to the integration of activity, and are to be found among the indicators 
derived from the informational and partisan theories. Typically, the participation coefficient 
lowered drastically after the 2004 election. If theories of legislative organization are able to 
predict well the distribution of committee work without preliminary distinctions, does this 
imply that the European Parliament is about to come to maturity?  
Yet, the split between an overwhelming majority of MEPs who never engage in 
committee work, and those who draw a large number of drafts is starker than ever. Whereas 
566 MEPs did not write any reports at all during the 6th legislature, Paolo Costa found the 
time to draw 50. Is this the consequence of a harder competition to obtain reports with a 
consequent higher degree of specialization?  
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The two consecutive EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 might well have boosted the 
relative specialization among incumbent members, effectively reinforcing the trend. Only 
studies of subsequent periods will be able to reveal whether this is the start of an ongoing 
trend, or simply circumstantial. 
All these distortions – the over estimation of central values, and the under estimation 
of zero counts and the long tail – are corollary to the use of central values in the estimation 
of regression coefficients. The general impression is, however, that the model captures well 
the essential traits of report distribution, though dimensions are weighted differently 
through time. 
7.1.2 Further Competition for Salient Reports – Predictors Lacking? 
The predicted outcomes from the second model (figure 7.2) on report salience are less 
precise than for the aggregated model of all MEPs. The deviances from the observed values 
are much the same, however more pronounced. Frequencies of zero acquisitions of salient 
reports are generally under-estimated, although the results are better on this point for the 
4th and the 6th period. Predictions of one single salient report are, on the other hand, always 
highly over-estimated, whereas the long tailed distribution of the dependent variable is 
barely reproduced.  
Anyhow, the fit lends some credit to the second model, as it still predicts more true 
outcomes than false. The deviances suggest, nonetheless, that there are other decisive 
factors in the selection to the most important legislative tasks. Few studies have been done 
previously on differential distribution according to legislative procedures, so that hardly any 
suggestions have been done. This is because data on report allocation and procedures 
previous to 1999 are not electronically available, and had to be collected by hand.   
 
Figure 7.1: Fitted Values vs. Observed Values – General Report Allocation 
The figure shows a bar plot of the predicted values of report allocation in model 6.2 
superposed by the observed frequency. 
 Although frequencies of zero reports tend to be under estimated, the model 
captures well the general trends in the data. 
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One exception is the study of co-decision reports allocated to national party delegations by 
Høyland: Rapporteurs who are likely to meet with governmental party colleagues in Council 
obtain more reports than MEPs who come from opposition parties. (2006: 44-45) He 
assumes this to be due to the augmented informational advantage of governmental parties, 
though co-decision is not controlled against other procedures which imply less contact with 
Council.  
From these results, further studies should look into broader measures of the 
expertise required for negotiations with Council, as this seems to be of increased 
importance.  
7.2 Outliers and Missing Values 
Because of the thorough documentation through minutes and list of members provided by 
Parliament itself, the data are of an exceptional quality. The extent of the observations 
makes furthermore statistical analyses robust to occasional outliers. 
7.2.1 Exceptionally Few Missing Values 
All the above mentioned data – the list of members, reports and roll-calls – have ultimately 
been provided from the EP itself, and should be considered to be as complete as they can 
possibly get. Yet, there are three sources of missing values:  
For the first two time periods information sometimes lacks on party group affiliation 
which I have been unable to complete. Because this concerns less than 3,7% of the EP 
members in any given period, I have simply excluded the observations when needed. 
Figure 7.2: Fitted Values vs. True Values – Model of Salient Report Allocation 
The figure shows a bar plot of the predicted values of report allocation in model 6.3 
superposed by observed frequencies. 
 The already defined criteria for report allocation tend to grow in importance as the 
relative impact of legislative drafts increases. The deviances suggest however other 
conditions also are relevant during the selection of the most powerful rapporteurs. 
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The second source of missing information comes from the data derived from 
NOMINATE scores. Since the scores are calculated from MEPs’ voting patterns during 
plenary sessions, these data are only possible to obtain for MEPs who have participated in a 
minimum number of roll-calls. These observations have to some extent been excluded from 
the final dataset simply because the statistical models are done with the exception of all 
MEPs who have stayed for less than 3 months in Parliament, considering this as the 
minimum of time needed to acquire, write and present a report. The proportion of missing 
NOMINATE values spans thereby from 7,7% in the 1st period to 1,4% in the 4th legislature. As 
one of the main points of Hix’ study of voting patterns is how coherent political group vote, 
missing NOMINATE coordinates have simply been replaced by the mean value in his or her 
political group. Information on non-affiliated members is replaced by the chamber mean. 
The general impression is that in the cases of missing information, the MEP does not 
distinguish himself as an ardent beholder of European reports. Rather the opposite. In five 
periods roughly 80%-100% of the MEPs with missing NOMINATE scores wrote no reports at 
all. The exclusion as well as the replacement by the group mean of these cases risk 
concealing to some degree the impact of certain characteristics. Yet, in the context of social 
science, these data are exceptionally complete. 
The third source of missing values is related to legislative procedures. During the 30 
years under study 4,2% of all reports lack procedural information (297 drafts out of 7092 
observations). As is the case with the other data, missing values tend to decrease as time 
passes. No reports have been excluded, however. In the early years of this study minutes 
tend to give explicit information on reports written under the more influent procedures, 
without necessarily doing the same for less exceptional reports. Observations with missing 
information are rather coded as non-salient reports, thus making it harder to procure results 
in the expected direction. As revealed from table 6.3, missing observations have not 
prevented the model from corroborating the theoretical outline of the study. 
7.2.2 Few Influential Outliers 
Unusual data may be a sign that important characteristics of the data are let out of the 
model. Combinations of unusual values on different variables may gain leverage to 
effectively influence the estimation of coefficients so that the latter no longer reflects the 
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general trends in the data. Certainly, there are high-leverage observations which have little 
influence on the regression coefficients simply because the combination of independent 
variables is similar to the trends in the rest of the data. Such combinations do in fact increase 
the precision of estimation. Conversely, constellations of unusual values decrease the 
precision. Analyses of unusual data in the present study have relied upon the covratio 
coefficient which is an influence measure proposed by Belsley et al. (1980, quoted in Fox, 
2008: 253; Fox, 2008: 241-253) 
Up to five observations have been deleted in each period because of their outlying 
values. The exclusion of these values modified neither the tendencies, nor the shape of 
predictions dramatically. The trends in all models are robust to occasional unusual 
observations, thereby showing no signs that essential characteristics in the data are omitted.    
7.3 Alternative Models – Robustness to Different 
Manipulations 
Are the outcomes of the analyses above simply the result of lucky choices during the 
statistical manipulation? The same variables will be fitted to two alternative models. 
Because one of the main characteristics in the theoretical model is the assumption that 
some MEPs are simply not inclined to engage in committee work, both models are 
specifically constructed to account for the zero counts in the response variable (i.e. the high 
amount of non-rapporteurs).  
7.3.1 Model Description – Accounting for High Levels of Zeros 
The first model is a hurdle model which consists in two successive analyses with parameter 
values estimated by maximum likelihood: A preliminary hurdle component models the 
binary outcome of positive counts (non-zeros). It undertakes thereby a selection of MEPs 
which it expects to become rapporteurs at least once during their term. The regression may 
either be a binomial distribution or a censored count model. The present study employs a 
binomial manipulation to estimate the likelihood of becoming rapporteur at least once 
during the legislative period. From the selection of observations done by this preliminary 
zero hurdle model a second count regression is fitted to predict the number of reports 
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allocated to each MEP. The count model is usually a truncated Poisson or negative binomial 
regression with log link. In the present the results come from a negative binomial model. 
(“hurdle”, http://pscl.stanford.edu/, author Jackman) 
The second alternative model consists in a zero-inflated regression analysis and is 
quite similar to the hurdle model. It is designed to account for excess zero counts in the 
dependent variable by the fitting of two different equations. It assumes zero counts to have 
two separate origins, one is derived from an unobserved state found in the point mass and 
one comes from the count model itself. The excess zero regression component consists in a 
binary model accounting for what is considered to be “excess” zeros in the observation (as 
compared to what is predicted by an ordinary count regression). The “true zeros” are then 
calculated in a count model. In the present the excess non-rapporteurs is modeled by a 
binomial model, whereas the distribution of reports is modeled by a poisson regression. The 
choice of a poisson model rather than the negative binomial analysis used previously is 
simply motivated by the wish to experiment to what extent the tendencies are robust to 
model choices. (“zeroinfl”, http://pscl.stanford.edu/, author Jackman)   
In both the hurdle and the zero-inflated model the two equations do not have to 
contain the same indicators, and may in fact correspond to two entirely different logics. In a 
more elaborate study of why some MEPs do not wish to participate, it would be interesting 
to define and operationalize different variables for the two stages in order to capture the 
precise reasons for self-selection. The present choice of integrating all indicators from the 
second negative binomial fit at both stages allows on the contrary for a more explorative 
approach. As the study has concentrated on characteristics shared by rapporteurs rather 
than the traits non-rapporteurs have in common, the limits between the indicators of binary 
non-zero and multiple positive counts risk to be blurred. 
7.3.2 Alternative Models Yield About the Same Results 
All alternative models indicate about the same trends of specialization, floor preference of 
moderate MEPs and partisan implications. Naturally, significance levels vary. Their general 
trends are much the same, however.  
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Figure 7.3: 
What Determines the Number of Reports MEPs Write? 
Count Model - Negative Binomial Model with Loglink 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -0,449   -0,968 ** -0,648 * -1,058 ** -0,464   -2,978 *** 
Specialization:                         
Periods in EP  -   -0,835   0,085   0,024   0,003   -0,074   
Incumbent Committee  - 
 
0,980 
 
0,061 
 
0,134 
 
0,198 † 0,524 * 
System Critics:                         
Eurosceptic 0,384 
 
-0,319 
 
0,226 
 
0,083 
 
0,039   0,199   
Partisan Expectations:                         
Ind. 0,050 
 
-0,418 
 
-0,295 
 
-0,162 
 
0,317   0,216   
Distance from Group 0,681   -1,442 † -1,069   0,518   -0,533   -10,84 ** 
Group Leader 0,005 
 
-0,398 * -0,216 
 
-0,114 
 
-0,119   -1,371 ** 
European Specificities:                         
Large Group -0,079 
 
-0,407 ** -0,052 
 
-0,034 
 
-0,074   0,267   
60+ -0,232 † -0,145   -0,137   -0,226 † -0,105   0,176   
Committee Chair 0,508 * 0,943 *** 0,984 *** 0,418 ** 1,281 *** 1,952 *** 
Committee Vice-Chair 0,274 † 0,358 * 0,071   0,194 † 0,182 † 0,234   
Activity:                         
Participation 1,784 *** 1,441 *** 1,071 *** 0,912 *** 1,847 *** 1,164 † 
Years in Term 0,180 * 0,414 *** 0,410 *** 0,420 *** 0,064   0,523 * 
Log (theta) 0,423 * 0,212   0,503 *** 1,069 *** 1,053 *** -0,449   
Zero Hurdle - Binomial Model 
(Intercept) -1,107 ** -1,337 *** -1,067 ** -3,263 *** -2,262 *** -2,887 *** 
Specialization:                         
Periods in EP  -   -0,550   -0,139   0,280   -0,337 * -0,119   
Incumbent Committee  -   0,384 
 
0,310   0,674 † 0,929 * 1,075 *** 
System Critics:                         
Eurosceptic 0,907 * -0,437 
 
-1,281 ** 1,761 *** -1,586 *** -1,212 ** 
Partisan Expectations:                         
Ind. -1,046 * 0,124 
 
-0,753 † -1,606 *** -2,348 *** -1,815 *** 
Distance from Group -4,616 ** -0,855   -2,323   -1,879   -0,702   -1,400   
Group Leader -1,336 *** -0,290 
 
-0,492   -0,991 ** -0,349   -0,343   
European Specificities:                         
Large Group -0,274   -0,376   -1,016 *** -0,182   0,200   -0,179   
60+ -0,442 † -0,610 * -1,140 *** -0,854 ** -1,194 *** -0,149   
Committee Chair 1,260 † 1,512 * 0,964   1,707 * 16,271   18,917   
Committee Vice-Chair -0,131   0,600 † 0,447   1,261 * 1,358 ** 18,902   
Activity:                         
Participation 3,721 *** 5,043 *** 6,476 *** 3,644 *** 2,252 *** 0,972   
Years in Term 0,430 *** 0,227 * 0,317 ** 0,660 *** 0,592 *** 0,476 *** 
N. Observations 533   612   596   697   699   927   
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The two alternative models of general report allocation (figure 7.3 and 7.4) as well as the 
hurdle model for salient reports (figure 7.5) all show the same trends. Most interesting are 
the distribution of effects between the zero and count models.  
Committee incumbency has high correlations in both model stages. In line with the 
results from model 6.3 on salient reports, policy expertise is closely related to increased 
impact whether this is measured by the number of all reports written or the accumulation of 
salient reports. Similarly are indicators of division of labor within the group continuous in 
nature.  
Indicators of legislative activity tend to come out significant in both parts of the 
models. This is in line with results from the second model on report salience in which 
participation rates, time in office and committee chairs continued to be determinant during 
draft allocation falling under important procedures. This suggests how the degree of interest 
in legislative tasks is continuous rather than binary. This makes sense, as measures of activity 
are only pragmatic proxies constructed to capture free-riders.  
 
Figure 7.3: Hurdle Model of General Report Allocation 
The figure shows the results of the hurdle model of the general report allocation. 
 The zero hurdle predicts MEPs who are likely to obtain at least one report, 
compared to those who never engage in legislative preparations. From this selection, the 
count model predicts the number of reports written by MEPs.  
Significance levels: † 90%; * 95%; ** 99%; *** 99,9% 
 
Figure 7.4: Zero-inflated Model for General Report Allocation 
The figure shows the results of the zero-inflated model of the general report allocation. 
 The zero model predicts MEPs who are likely to never engage in legislative 
preparations. Negative values in the zero model indicate therefore increasing likelihood to 
obtain reports. From this selection, the count model predicts the number of reports written 
by MEPs. Negative values in the count model therefore express decreasing likelihood of 
obtaining several reports. 
Significance levels: † 90%; * 95%; ** 99%; *** 99,9% 
 
89 
 
 
What Determines the Number of Reports MEPs Write? 
Count Model – Poisson Model with Loglink 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) 0,069   -0,361   -0,375 † -0,724 ** -0,001   -1,494 *** 
Specialization:                         
Periods in EP - 
 
-0,746   0,051   0,026   0,007   -0,096 * 
Incumbent Committee - 
 
0,866 † 0,051 
 
0,128 † 0,153 * 0,516 *** 
System Critics:                         
Eurosceptic 0,388 ** -0,303 * 0,176 
 
0,053   0,042   -0,023   
Partisan Expectations:                         
Ind. 0,062 
 
-0,296 * -0,266 
 
-0,193   0,306 † -0,079   
Distance from Group 0,477   -1,398 ** -1,261 ** 0,359   -0,489   -4,213 *** 
Group Leader -0,101 
 
-0,385 *** -0,138 * -0,091   -0,130   -0,792 ** 
European Specificities:                         
Large Group -0,077 
 
-0,368 *** 0,018 
 
-0,033   -0,064   0,123   
60+ -0,176 ** -0,265 ** -0,128 † -0,207 ** -0,088   0,296 *** 
Committee Chair 0,444 *** 0,842 *** 0,813 *** 0,395 *** 1,137 *** 1,546 *** 
Committee Vice-Chair 0,151 † 0,252 *** 0,084   0,187 ** 0,163 ** 0,256 ** 
Activity:                         
Participation 1,332 *** 1,205 *** 0,663 *** 0,855 *** 1,643 *** 0,229   
Years in Term 0,156 ** 0,350 *** 0,419 *** 0,368 *** 0,011   0,481 *** 
Excess Zero Model – Binomial Model 
(Intercept) 0,545   0,321   -0,273   2,374 *** 1,647 ** 1,331 * 
Specialization:                         
Periods in EP  -   -0,328   0,151   -0,313   0,422 * 0,073   
Incumbent Committee  -   0,609 
 
-0,351   -0,636 
 
-1,003 * -0,841 ** 
System Critics:                         
Eurosceptic -0,719   0,315 
 
1,540 ** -2,232 ** 1,888 *** 1,373 ** 
Partisan Expectations:                         
Ind. 1,213 * -0,506 
 
0,710   1,659 *** 2,778 *** 1,992 *** 
Distance from Group 5,313 ** -0,790   1,619   2,572   0,446   -3,498   
Group Leader 1,422 *** 0,064 
 
0,390   1,059 ** 0,307   -0,327   
European Specificities:                         
Large Group 0,303   0,120 
 
1,274 *** 0,194 
 
-0,404   0,284   
60+ 0,375   0,482   1,239 *** 0,784 * 1,426 *** 0,309   
Committee Chair -1,213   -0,925 
 
-0,732   -1,498 † -16,271   -18,917   
Committee Vice-Chair 0,218   -0,547   -0,656   -1,216 * -1,500 * -18,902   
Activity:                         
Participation -3,362 *** -5,670 *** -7,247 *** -3,403 *** -0,319   -1,011   
Years in Term -0,397 ** 0,095 
 
0,039   -0,524 *** -0,875 *** -0,163   
N. Observations 533   612   596   697   699   927   
 
 
90 
 
On the other hand, some results tend to reach their highest correlations in the zero model. 
Simple long-termers without committee incumbency do not generally take on reports at all, 
illustrating once again the impact of nominations done by national parties. Some MEPs stay 
in Parliament for several terms without ever participating in legislative work. High age has an 
increased negative correlation to report allocation during the initial modeling of zeros, with 
a less pronounced impact in the count models. MEPs close to retirement do generally not 
engage in committee work at all.  
The effect of eurosceptic groups and non-affiliated members appears more clearly 
during the initial model selection indicating that they generally don’t participate in legislative 
preparations. Effects become less distinguishable in the second count model. If they have 
been deemed eligible once, group affiliation does not prove an obstacle for further 
acquisitions. This is especially the case among eurosceptics. The trend might imply the 
inclination among these members to avoid legislative activity by opting out, rather than the 
floor shunning their representation. 
The joint analysis of the zero-inflated and hurdle models indicate the same 
hierarchical traits revealed by the comparison of general- and salient report allocation. 
Trends are quite robust to different manipulations.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Hurdle Model for Salient Reports 
The figure shows the results of the hurdle model of the salient report allocation among 
rapporteurs. 
 The zero hurdle predicts MEPs who are likely to obtain at least one salient report, 
compared to those who have only written non-salient reports. From this selection, the 
count model predicts the number of influent reports written by MEPs.  
 Committee incumbency includes in this model only MEPs who wrote at least one 
report during the previous legislature. The indicator thereby includes both a policy specific 
element and some political know-how. 
Significance levels: † 90%; * 95%; ** 99%; *** 99,9% 
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What Determines the Number of Salient Reports MEPs Write? 
Count Model - Negative Binomial Model with loglink 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -0,438   -0,404   -0,569   -0,408   0,324   -0,251   
Specialization:                         
Incumbent Committee     -0,032   0,594 ** 0,500 ** 0,289 * 0,553 ** 
Representativeness                         
Distance from Floor -0,408   -0,192   0,228   0,619   0,155   -3,458 ** 
Partisan Expectations:                         
Distance from Group 1,500   -2,066 * 0,459   1,226   -0,629   -0,621   
Group Leader 0,310   0,007 
 
-0,607 † -0,245   0,390 † -1,056   
Activity:                         
Committee Chair 0,433   0,665 
 
0,550   0,025   0,791 *** 1,599 *** 
Committee Vice-Chair 0,069   0,274   0,477 † -0,060   0,235   0,205   
Participation 1,738 *** 1,924 *** 1,711 ** 0,567   0,330   0,468   
Log (theta) -0,321   -0,098   -0,300   0,445   1,158 *** 0,586   
Zero Hurdle - Binomial Model 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -0,048   -0,517 † -0,773 * -0,997 * -1,978 *** -0,088   
Specialization:                         
Incumbent Committee     0,102   0,264   0,498 * 0,093   0,800 ** 
Representativeness                         
Distance from Floor -0,474   -0,200   -0,187   0,847   0,203   0,253   
Partisan Expectations:                         
Distance from Group 0,561   -1,037 * -2,826   1,811   -0,007   -1,473   
Group Leader -0,104   -0,726   -0,291   -0,056   -0,491   -0,681   
Activity:                         
Committee Chair 0,517   0,705   0,075   -0,635   1,363 ** 0,528   
Committee Vice-Chair 0,685 † 0,017   -0,552 * 0,011   0,365   -0,019   
Participation 2,279 *** 1,428 ** 1,354 * 0,366   2,028 *** 0,605   
N. Observations 336   395   424   471   514   371   
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What Determines the Number of Salient Reports MEPs Write? 
Count Model - Negative Binomial Model 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -0,162   -0,359   -0,939 * -0,387   0,280   -0,224   
Specialization:                         
Incumbent Committee  -   0,001   0,484 * 0,522 ** 0,297 * 0,503 *** 
Representativeness                         
Distance from Floor -0,266   -0,397   0,016   0,566   0,106   -1,617 * 
Partisan Expectations:                         
Distance from Group 0,987   -0,941   -0,170   1,016   -0,643   1,385   
Group Leader 0,396   0,017   -0,472 † -0,259   0,401 † -0,533   
Activity:                         
Committee Chair 0,221 † 0,715 ** 0,555   -0,002   0,798 *** 1,433 *** 
Committee Vice-Chair  -   0,271   0,458   -0,032   0,243   0,121   
Participation 1,692 *** 1,647 *** 2,232 *** 0,563   0,410   0,447   
Log (theta) 0,402 ** -0,315 * -0,804 *** 0,430   1,156 *** 1,190 *** 
Zero Model - Binomial Model 
  EP1 EP2 EP3 EP4 EP5 EP6 
(Intercept) -277,350   -65,246   -7,316   -0,392   1,560 * -12,619   
Specialization:                         
Incumbent Committee  -   -25,411   -0,839   -0,164   0,077   -1,200   
Representativeness                         
Distance from Floor 223,915   -163,558   -0,476   -0,860   -0,253   -16,887   
Partisan Expectations:                         
Distance from Group 109,954   415,124   9,224   -2,962   -0,417   29,978   
Group Leader 150,870   222,254   1,152   -0,326   0,754 † 4,872   
Activity:                         
Committee Chair -42,432   -57,527   2,732   0,972   -1,208 * 10,281   
Committee Vice-Chair  -   122,330   4,255   -0,025   -0,283   6,698   
Participation 35,728   -328,483   4,970   0,099   -2,098 ** 3,570   
N. Observations 336   395   424   471   514   371   
 
The zero-inflated model for report salience (figure 7.6) is, on the other hand, hardly fit for 
these data. The unobserved secondary source of zeros which the model is made to detect 
are absent from the data which no longer includes non-rapporteurs. The model then turns to 
become a simple negative binomial model. This illustrates a contrario the potential of 
hurdles in future joint modeling of non-rapporteurs and rapporteurs alike. Further analyses 
which include more thorough indicators of non-rapporteurs should explore the possibilities 
offered by hurdle or zero-inflated equations to model simultaneously the theoretical 
characteristics of non-rapporteurs and rapporteurs. 
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From the testing done in this chapter, however, it is apparent that the statistical models of 
both the general report allocation and the distribution of salient reports are robust. 
Although the model of salient reports may profit from additional indicators of expertise – 
obtained either from previous experience or policy networks – both models of report 
allocation predict reasonably well the distributional outcome. The alternative models 
illustrate once more how organizational criteria increase with the level of influence. This 
influence has been measured both through the general accumulation of reports and through 
the buildup of salient legislative drafts. There is a hierarchy among MEPs, and the resulting 
distinctions are organized to profit the assembly as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Zero-Inflated Model for Salient Reports 
The figure shows the results of the zero-inflataed model of the salient report allocation 
among rapporteurs. 
 The zero hurdle predicts MEPs who are likely to obtain at least one salient report, 
compared to those who have only written non-salient reports. From this selection, the 
count model predicts the number of influent reports written by MEPs.  
 Committee vice-chairs are coded with committee chairs during the 1st period as the 
system would otherwise be computationally singular. As can be seen from the low levels of 
significance and the excessive correlation coefficients in the zero model, the two-level 
statistical modeling is hardly fit to data which do not include non-rapporteurs. There is no 
unobserved source of zeros for which zero-inflated models have been constructed to 
model. 
Significance levels: † 90%; * 95%; ** 99%; *** 99,9% 
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8 Conclusion 
Despite divergent ambitions among MEPs; Parliament has developed much of the 
organizational traits needed to assert its position. 
Transnational Politics 
The present study distinguishes itself from much of the previous literature by its slight 
insistence on the international aspects of the European Parliament. Transnational caucuses 
are the primary level of organization. Their principal role in the formal proceedings of report 
allocation is further corroborated by the higher degree of proportionality found among 
political groups. As was illustrated in the particular case of new member states, the relative 
handicap of national newcomers is to some degree palliated by transnational party groups 
which hold the experience new national delegations lack. They hold an integrationist role 
which is crucial to the political representativeness – and thereby the legitimacy – of the 
chamber.  
This is not to deny the secondary role of nationality. Rather, instead of entering into 
the impasse of determining which one has the upper-hand in case of a conflict, we have in 
the present explored the general organizational trends in Parliament. Further research 
should do a comprehensive distinction of the points of influence of each source of 
preference – the national and the transnational – before resuming a more informed debate. 
 The review reveals however another transnational specificity which has largely been 
ignored in previous studies: The different personal ambitions of MEPs.  
Despite Scarrow’s early attempts to highlight the importance of career paths (1997), 
no previous study has gone to efforts to systematically discard MEPs who do not participate 
in the competition for reports. The study has successfully included two indicators to capture 
careerist intentions. Both the time spent in office and participation rates during voting point 
toward a serious chasm in the EP between MEPs who seek influence and those who do not.  
The present study has disclosed how some EP long-termers are void of any European 
ambitions. In fact, because nomination much depends on national parties, reelection is 
frequently ensured for reasons completely foreign to the work accomplished in Parliament. 
Being a young institution the EP harbors an important fraction of system-critics who 
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generally avoid legislative work. The low participation rates of MEPs close to retirement age 
goes furthermore a long way in confirming Corbett’s fears that national politicians are put 
out to grass in the EP.  
Although the second order nature of European elections should weaken the 
incentives for MEPs to engage in legislative work, some parliamentarians distinguish 
themselves as highly active legislators. The system of rapporteurs allows parliamentarians to 
exchange influence in different policy domains, effectively spurring members to specialize. 
Once free-riders on the European system are discarded from the analysis, classical 
theories of legislative organization apply surprisingly well.  
Majority Discipline in View of Collective Gains 
The European Parliament is in control of its policy expertise. The combination of the 
informational and partisan perspectives has proven rewarding. Legislative organization in 
the EP corresponds to a two-level game in which the chamber majority select party groups in 
a rather consensual manner – although policy outliers are not favored. Party groups then 
pick their representatives for legislative tasks much according to the same principles of 
policy expertise and representativeness. 
 
Expertise to Challenge the Council and Commission  
Expertise in specific policy areas is all the more valuable when legislation tends to be 
detailed, and because European parliamentarians are granted fewer resources than their 
counterparts in Council and Commission. In an assembly with careerist politicians much of 
the know-how is in fact acquired inside Parliament. This is also the case with the EP in which 
specialization is done through committee work.   
 Results from the present study corroborate the informational hypothesisb2 of a 
specialization among key-legislators. Rapporteurs have on average stayed longer on 
committees than their colleagues. The degree of expertise increases with the number of 
drafts written, indicating the propensity of MEPs to specialize in special policy domains. 
Specialization increases further when negotiations move to become inter-institutional. 
During the more influent procedures, policy expertise and political skills are imperative, as 
the rapporteur defends his propositions in face of the highly informed Council and 
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Commission. Consequently, party group leaders leave extensive dossiers to rank-and-file 
members with more time on their hands. When no one volunteers, the committee chair 
assumes responsibility for the more important drafts, not the vice-chair. 
Despite the exchange of influence done among rapporteurs, however, specialization 
is not the result of self-selection. The chamber has kept control over its experts. 
 
Majority Selection by the Floor 
Floor selection of key-legislators is done on two stages. Report allocation is done on subject 
basis throughout the whole legislative period. Open rules ensures political outcomes are 
supported by the majority of the chamber. By way of consequence, the likelihood of being 
named rapporteur shrinks as an MEP moves away from the median floor preferences on the 
main political dimension.   
The competitive report allocation is done within a consensual system negotiated at 
the beginning of each legislature, however. Whereas moderate MEPs have always been 
preferred in the preparation of individual pieces of legislation, the institutional bargain has 
changed. The assembly is on its way to obtain political maturity. Starting out as a 
consultative body, the European Parliament has gone quite systematically to the task of 
enhancing its influence. Some of the effects of these changes may be observed in the 
selection of rapporteurs. The 3rd legislature constitutes a turning point in this respect. 
EP’s budgetary role was enhanced from the beginning of the 3rd legislature by a series 
of pragmatic agreements. Since 1988 four inter-institutional agreements have been 
concluded between Parliament, Council and Commission which has committed all parties to 
a four year long financial perspective. This has opened for more initiatives with financial 
implications from Parliament. (Corbett, 2007: 248-250) The Maastricht treaty (1992) further 
enhanced what was already in preparation from the Single European Act (1989) and erected 
the EP to the role of a co-legislator to Council.   
As both the budgetary and the legislative role of Parliament were improved, the 
politics of grand coalition were no longer as necessary. Hix’ claims that left-right coalition 
politics peaked during the 3rd legislature (2009: 1-2) are in fact funded on the declining 
perception of an institutional battle.  
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“Parliament’s role has evolved and in a way that has reinforced the level of co-decision 
with the Council. The two institutions increasingly seek mutually acceptable outcomes 
based on a shared perception of each other’s role, rather than Parliament attempting to 
use the treaty articles to impose its will on the Council.” (Corbett, 2007: 250) 
 
The consensual distribution of influence in Parliament is a prerequisite for institutional 
bargains. Instead of a grand coalition merely between the PES and PPE, the general report 
allocation reflects a broader consensus in the EP. From the first direct elections to the 3rd 
period included large party groups are by way of consequence under-represented among 
influential legislators to accommodate the smaller caucuses. The situation has since evolved. 
The two largest party groups are no longer significantly under-represented. Non-affiliated 
members are on the other hand increasingly overlooked during legislative preparations. As 
the institutional pressure diminishes, ideologically oriented caucuses become more 
important. 
 The 1989-94 legislature constitutes a first step towards normalization of the EP. The 
political class created after the 1979 elections is about to take form, and party group politics 
evolves in a more conventional political environment.   
 
Partisan Selection 
The EP has developed a legislative organization in which political groups are central pieces. 
The feeble presence of non-affiliated members shows they are odd elements in the 
institutional setting. Transnational parliamentarian groups provide a forum in which 
information circulates quite freely. Policy-makers are selected who can be expected to 
procure and manipulate information for the common benefits of the group. Rapporteurs 
thereby tend to reflect the median preferences of their group. The perception of a common 
purpose has furthermore led party group leaders to delegate legislative tasks to their more 
competent and loyal group members, rather than accumulating dossiers themselves.  
Indicators of policy representativeness reveal nonetheless stronger correlations 
during the selection for all reports than for the most salient ones. This may be related to 
aptitudes needed in different stages of legislation: Any rapporteur has to act as a broker 
between party groups in order for his draft to win through during plenary. Because of the 
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delicate nature of coalition-building, the selection of loyal and moderate key-legislators is 
done on an early stage both by party group coordinators and the chamber majority. Policy 
expertise becomes, on the other hand, increasingly important as Parliament’s position is 
defied.  
These findings are quite in line with Bowler and Farrell’s conclusions: The EP has 
developed both the specialization needed to assert its powers and the means to control and 
coordinate expertise. Parliament’s leadership has developed mechanisms to maintain order 
in the chamber. This is especially the case for transnational groups which are responsible for 
the allotment of legislative tasks, providing them with the disciplinary tools to organize their 
members in an effective manner (1995: 241). 
Further Normalization? 
Quite a number of the results from the 6th legislature are somewhat different from previous 
tendencies. To what degree are they precursors of a further normalization of EP legislative 
organization?  
 The impact of measures of careerist ambitions diminishes after the 2004 election in 
both analyses of allocations of reports and salient drafts. MEPs close to retirement are no 
longer less active. Participation rates during roll-call sessions are still highly significant, yet its 
amplitude reaches a low. Contrary to previous periods, theoretically funded variables are 
able to predict the shape of report distribution. Is the group of uninterested, non-careerist 
MEPs on its way out?    
 Signs of an ordinary organization of the EP become more pronounced. Group loyalty 
has an increased impact, whereas group chairmen delegate more reports than ever. 
Likewise, policy-outliers are punished more scrupulously than before. Committee 
incumbency has furthermore greater impact during the 6th period in both regressions. 
Remembering, however, the two consecutive EU enlargements this may simply be an 
effect of nationality. The positive change in the French, Italian and Portuguese 
representation in the bivariate analysis in combination with the decrease in rapporteurs 
from the UK and the Netherlands also indicate a major change during the 6th legislature. The 
arrival of 12 new member states might have made it necessary for the remaining core of 
MEPs to redouble their efforts. Committee chairmen and vice-chairmen were also widely 
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used during all types of legislative procedures, indicating either less capacity among MEPs to 
take on reports or a different inclination to engage in committee work. Only the study of 
future parliaments will be able to determine whether the proportion of non-ambitious MEPs 
has declined. The exceptionally skewed distribution of reports during the 6th legislature 
would in that case be the result of a harsher selection along conventional criteria. 
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